deeds and the illegal approval of management plans for alerce trees, in response to electoral promises made by the senator during his political campaign, of which [he had] evidence.”68 61. The aforementioned judgment concluded that Mr. Baraona acted with the intention to cause injury and “did not express personal opinions, but rather assertions, which in no way represented specialized political criticism.” It added that at no time did his statements focus on a hypothesis, but rather on unproven allegations. Furthermore, the officials who, according to Mr. Baraona, had been pressured, denied such assertions. Thus, the judge did not consider Mr. Baraona’s statements to be sufficiently serious and reasonable. Finally, she stated that the defendant’s accusations against Senator SP were mere conjectures or rumors that disproportionately sacrificed the senator’s right to honor, which was the basis of the seriousness of the injury.69 The Guarantee Court then decided to suspend the sentence imposed on Mr. Baraona and its effects for a period of 6 months.70 E.2. Appeal for annulment before the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Chile 62. The Public Defender’s Office, on behalf of Carlos Baraona Bray, filed an appeal for annulment of the judgment of the Guarantee Court of Puerto Montt, alleging a substantial infringement of the rights to defense, due process and freedom of expression. It also alleged the erroneous application of the law, since the defendant was convicted for an act that did not constitute a crime, because the animus injuriandi was not proven and the exceptio veritatis was required for the statements that allegedly constituted insults. The appeal was lodged with the Supreme Court of Chile, which, after analyzing the merits of the appeal, rejected it and concluded that, although freedom of opinion by its intrinsic nature could not be characterized as abusive or criminal, the same was not true of freedom of information with respect to conduct or facts that were verifiable, such as those reported in the present case with respect to Senator SP. It established that freedom of information did not include the communication of false facts, since the Constitution does not protect the right to disinformation or insult.71 63. In its ruling, the Supreme Court stated that “[Carlos Baraona Bray] reported certain matters, which even though they were public, constituted facts that were not necessarily true, since their veracity was not clearly proven or corroborated by other information or news sources. It [is] evident that the defendant exceeded the reasonable and prudent limits of what he recklessly disclosed as true facts, when they were false, and in this regard he did not [have] the constitutional protection that he require[d], but in addition, he harmed another person, who also had [the right] to honor […].”72 In relation to the animus injuriandi, the Supreme Court decided that, although for certain criminal offenses the law required the presence of a special intent as a characteristic element, there were already jurisprudential criteria by which this intent to injure was understood as the malice of the crime, consisting in simply in knowing that the expression proffered or the action executed dishonors, discredits or disparages. Therefore, the Supreme Court agreed with the judgment of the Guarantee Court in the sense that Mr. Baraona was aware of the dishonorable tenor of his comments, and that these could not be considered as sufficiently serious and reasonable. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied the appeal for annulment.73 68 69 70 71 72 73 Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Judgment Judgment Judgment Judgment Judgment Judgment of of of of of of the the the the the the Court of Guarantee of Puerto Montt, of June 22, 2004, supra. Court of Guarantee of Puerto Montt, of June 22, 2004, supra. Court of Guarantee of Puerto Montt, of June 22, 2004, supra. Supreme Court, of September 9, 2004 (evidence file, folios 134 to 151). Supreme Court, of September 9, 2004, supra. Supreme Court, of September 9, 2004, supra. 21