B.3 Content of the right to freedom of expression 101. In its case law, the Court has given ample content to the right to freedom of expression, recognized in Article 13 of the Convention. The Court has indicated that this provision protects the right to seek, receive and disseminate ideas and information of all kinds, as well as the right to receive and know the information and ideas disseminated by others.120 It has also pointed out that freedom of expression has an individual dimension and a social dimension, from which it has derived a series of rights that are protected in said article.121 The Court has affirmed that both dimensions are of equal importance and must be fully guaranteed simultaneously, in order to give full effect to the right to freedom of expression, in the terms provided for in Article 13 of the Convention.122 102. The first dimension of freedom of expression includes the right to use any appropriate means to disseminate opinions, ideas and information in order to reach the greatest number of recipients. In this sense, expression and dissemination are indivisible, so that a restriction on the possibilities of dissemination represents directly, and to the same extent, a restriction on the right to express oneself freely. Similarly, the Court has pointed out that the social dimension of the right to freedom of expression implies everyone’s right to know opinions, stories and news expressed by third parties. For the ordinary citizen, knowledge of the opinions of others or the information available to others, is as important as the right to disseminate one’s own. That is why, in light of both dimensions, freedom of expression requires, on the one hand, that no one be arbitrarily undermined or prevented from expressing his or her own thoughts and, on the other hand, it implies a collective right to receive any information and to know the expression of other people’s thoughts.123 B.4 Permissible restrictions on freedom of expression and the application of subsequent liabilities 103. The Court has reiterated that freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Article 13(2) of the Convention, which prohibits prior censorship, also provides for the possibility of demanding subsequent liability for the abusive exercise of this right, including to ensure “respect for the rights or reputation of others” (paragraph (a) of Article 13(2)). These restrictions are of an exceptional nature and must not limit, beyond what is strictly necessary, the full exercise of freedom of expression and become a direct or indirect mechanism of prior censorship.124 Thus, the Court has established that such subsequent liabilities can be imposed, only insofar as the right to honor and reputation could have been affected.125 104. On this matter, this Court has reiterated in its case law that Article 13(2) of the American Convention establishes that subsequent liability for the exercise of freedom of expression must comply with the following requirements concurrently: (i) be previously 120 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, para. 30, and Case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 62. 121 Cf. Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v. Chile, supra, para. 64, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 97. 122 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Reparations and costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series No. 74, para. 149, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 97. 123 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, supra, para. 146, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 98. 124 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 120, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 100. 125 Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 123, and Case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 73. 32