139. The Court confirms that Mr. Baraona was prosecuted under Articles 416, 417 and 418 of the Chilean Criminal Code and convicted for the criminal offense of serious insults set forth in Articles 417 and 418 of said Code, as well as Article 29 of Law No. 19.733 on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Practice of Journalism, in force at the time of the facts. Therefore, the Court deems it necessary to examine the conventionality of the aforementioned articles in light of Articles 9 and 13 of the American Convention. 140. The Court notes that Article 417 of the Criminal Code, which refers to the aggravating circumstances of the crime of insult (supra para. 45), mentions different criteria for determining whether or not the insult is serious. One of them is established in paragraph 3 of said provision, which indicates as an aggravating factor the imputation “of a vice or lack of morality whose consequences may significantly harm the reputation, credit or interests of the offended party.” Likewise, paragraph 4 of said article states that “insults that by their nature, occasion or circumstances are understood by the public as an affront” are considered serious, while paragraph 5 provides that insults may be classified as serious “considering the status and circumstances of the offended party and of the offender.” 141. As stated previously, criminal offenses that restrict the exercise of freedom of expression must be defined in a clear and precise manner. However, in the opinion of this Court, the definition of serious insults set forth in Article 417 of the Criminal Code does not meet this standard. On the one hand, it refers to open-ended and non-specific concepts such as the imputation of a vice or lack of morality (paragraph 3), and on the other, it states that the seriousness of the insult must be classified according to the circumstances of the offended party (paragraph 5), which may be associated with the status of the offended party as a public official and is therefore contrary to the standards previously established in this judgment (supra para. 45). 142. Based on the foregoing, the content of the law applied in the instant case does not strictly delimit the conduct defined in Article 417 of the Criminal Code as serious insult, the crime for which Mr. Baraona was convicted. Consequently, the Court considers that the State violated the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 13 thereof and Articles 1(1) and 2 of the same instrument, to the detriment of Carlos Baraona Bray. VIII-4 RIGHT TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN RELATION TO THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT RIGHTS166 A. Arguments of the Commission and the parties 143. The Commission argued that Mr. Baraona Bray filed an appeal for annulment against the decision of the Guarantee Court of Puerto Montt that violated his right to freedom of expression. However, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court failed to carry out a control of conventionality by applying inter-American standards and instead ratified the first instance decision, even though the facts and opinions expressed by the alleged victim were related to issues of great public interest in Chile and could be considered credible. The Supreme Court demanded that the alleged victim prove the truth of his statements, despite the fact that Carlos Baraona had specified the sources on which he relied, which led him to reasonably believe, based on the circumstances of the public debate, that the information he had provided regarding the senator’s actions was credible. The Commission considered that the Supreme Court did not conduct an analysis in accordance with the standards derived from Article 13 of 166 Article 25(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof. 42