Court established that, although for certain criminal offenses the law required the concurrence of specific intent as a legal component, which normally occurred with comments made maliciously or knowingly, there were already jurisprudential criteria by which this intent to injure was understood as the malice of the crime, consisting simply in knowing that the expression proffered or the action executed was dishonorable, discrediting or demeaning. For the above reasons, the Supreme Court agreed with the judgment of the Guarantee Court in the sense that Mr. Baraona was aware of the dishonorable nature of his statements, and that these could not be considered sufficiently serious and reasonable. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied the appeal for annulment (supra para. 63). 152. Consequently, the Court considers that, in the absence of an adequate assessment of the scope of the right to freedom of expression, the appeal for annulment cannot be deemed to have been an effective remedy in the case under study. Therefore, the State is responsible for the violation of Article 25(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of the same instrument, to the detriment of Carlos Baraona Bray. 153. The Court further notes that, despite the fact that the sentence was suspended and that the Judiciary later dismissed the criminal case against Mr. Baraona on August 1, 2005 and filed it on August 10 of the same year, without imposing any sanction, Mr. Baraona was the victim of the imposition of a sentence that remained in force until the date of the dismissal. IX REPARATIONS 154. Based on the provisions of Article 63(1) of the American Convention, the Court has held that any violation of an international obligation that has caused harm entails the duty to make adequate reparation, and that this provision reflects a customary norm that constitutes one of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law on State responsibility.175 155. Reparation for the harm caused by the breach of an international obligation requires, whenever possible, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which consists of reestablishing the situation prior to the violation.176 If this is not feasible, as occurs in the majority of cases of human rights violations, the Court may order measures to protect the rights that have been violated and repair the harm caused.177 Accordingly, the Court has considered the need to provide different types of reparation in order to fully redress the damage; thus, in addition to pecuniary compensation, other measures such as satisfaction, restitution, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition have special relevance owing to the severity of the harm caused.178 156. The Court has also established that reparations must have a causal nexus with the facts of the case, the violations declared, the damage proven, and the measures requested to Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and costs. Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, para. 25, and Case of Leguizamón Zaván v. Paraguay, supra, para. 91. 176 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and costs, supra, para. 26, and Case of Aroca Palma et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 8, 2022, para. 121. 177 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and costs, supra, para. 26, and Case of Aroca Palma et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 121. 178 Cf. Case of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2009. Series C No. 211, para. 226, and Case of Aroca Palma et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 121. 175 45