2. If a judge is disqualified from hearing a case or for some other appropriate reason considers that he should not take part in a specific matter, he shall advise the President of his disqualification. Should the latter disagree, the Court shall decide. […] 9. Article 21 (Impediments, recusals and disqualifications) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure stipulates, inter alia, that: 1. Impediments, recusals, and the disqualification of judges shall be governed by the provisions of Article 19 of the Statute and Article 19 of these Rules of Procedure. 2. Motions for recusal or allegations of impediment must be filed prior to the first hearing of the case. […] 10. The Court understands that Judge Vio Grossi presented his recusal based on the fact that a judge is empowered to disqualify himself from hearing a case if he considers that he has a well-founded reason and in order to guarantee certainty of the impartiality of the court that will hear the case. This faculty is established in the second paragraph of Article 19 of the Court’s Statute. The Court agrees with Judge Vio Grossi’s observations in his note of November 23, 2012 (supra having seen paragraph 6), to the effect that, pursuant to Article 19(2) of this Court’s Statute, it is for the President of the Court and, eventually, the Court itself, to decide whether to accept or reject a recusal presented by a judge, and that the pertinent norms have not contemplated any manifestation by the parties in this regard. 11. The decision to accept the recusal presented by Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi was adopted by the President of the Court, in consultation with the other judges, pursuant to the statutory provisions. The Court found it reasonable to accept his request, considering that the motive given by Judge Vio Grossi was based on the excellent professional and workrelated relationship that he had with the presumed victim in this case (supra third considering paragraph). Consequently, the Court confirms that Judge Vio Grossi’s recusal from hearing this case was presented and accepted in strict observance of the statutory and regulatory provisions that govern this matter. 12. The State’s brief of November 12, 2012, also contains affirmations on alleged “pressure” that “other judges of the Court” exercised on Judge Vio Grossi so that he would not hear the case. The Court rejects the offensive and totally unfounded assertions made by the State. Judge Vio Grossi himself, in a communication of November 23, 2012 (supra having seen paragraph 6 and seventh considering paragraph), stated that “[s]uch affirmations, made without any grounds and which, evidently are absolutely false, constitute, in [his] opinion, an offense to the Court and to its members,” and “also offend [him] additionally, because they suppose that he would have succumbed to this type of pressure and that, consequently, this could happen again in the future, in other cases.” 13. On other occasions, 1 Venezuela has been advised that the use of offensive expressions is manifestly inappropriate and inadmissible in any judicial proceeding, and especially before an international court. Under ordinary circumstances, the use of offensive expressions would result in the brief containing them being returned to whosoever had presented it, without processing it in any way, ordering them to use appropriate language. 1 Cf. Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela. Order of the acting President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of September 3, 2010, seventh considering paragraph; Case of the Barrios Family v. Venezuela. Order of the acting President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of April 14, 2011, eleventh considering paragraph; Case of Nestor José and Luis Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela. Order of the acting President of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of June 24, 2011, eleventh considering paragraph; Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela. Order of the acting President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of June 24, 2011, eleventh considering paragraph, and Case of Castillo González et al. v. Venezuela. Order of the acting President of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of November 25, 2011, eleventh considering paragraph. 3