VII RIGHT TO LIFE (ARTICLE 4(1) OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION) 183. The Commission indicated that the right to life “includes […] the right to […] conditions that guarantee a decent existence.” It added that “the State’s failure to comply […] with its obligation to guarantee the Community’s right to property” has meant “the creation of a permanent situation of vulnerability that even threatens the physical survival of the members of the Community.” 184. The representatives argued that “[t]he State [did] not […] rectify the conditions that exacerbate the difficulties faced by the members of the Community to have access to a decent life, in response to its particular vulnerability.” According to the representatives, the “failure to restore the ancestral lands and traditional habitat of the Community […] has made it impossible for its members to hunt, fish and gather on the lands and in the habitat claimed, thus affecting their cultural and religious identity, and placing them in a situation of extreme vulnerability.” Lastly, they asked that the State be attributed with international responsibility for the death of several members of the Community. 185. The State affirmed that it had provided assistance with regard to food and hygiene. It also indicated that “there is no relationship between the land and physical survival […] as a basis for the alleged failure to protect the right to life.” It added that, “State agents have never forced the indigenous people to leave their lands; to the contrary, they have made considerable efforts to find other places within the ancestral territory.” It emphasized that it was not possible to attribute the State with responsibility for the said deaths. 186. The Court has indicated that the right to life is a fundamental human right, the full enjoyment of which is a precondition for the enjoyment of all the other human rights.192 If this right is not respected, all the other rights are meaningless. Therefore, restrictive notions with regard to this right are not admissible.193 187. Consequently, the States are obliged to ensure the creation of the necessary conditions to prevent violations of this right and, in particular, the obligation to prevent its agents from endangering it. The observance of Article 4, in relation to Article 1(1) of the Convention, not only presumes that no one be deprived of their life arbitrarily (negative obligation), but also requires the States to take all appropriate measures to protect and preserve the right to life (positive obligation),194 in keeping with the obligation to ensure the full and free exercise, without discrimination, of the rights of all persons under their jurisdiction.195 192 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales and et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, supra para. 167, para. 144; Case of Montero Aragorn et al. (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006, Series C. No. 150, para. 63, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166, para. 78. 193 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, supra note 167, para. 144; Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela, supra note 192, para. 63, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 192, para. 78. 194 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, supra note 167 para. 144; Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, supra note 14, para. 74, and Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 14 para. 245. 195 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 120; Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, supra note 14 para. 74, and Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 14, para. 245. 42