10 turned into a victim of a human rights violation. Such imbalance needs to be corrected, even by way of a Judgment on Interpretation: this Judgment on Interpretation of the Court in the case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees hardly contributes, if it does at all, to the achievement of such goal. V. Access to Justice and the Extension of the Material Scope of Jus Cogens. 35. For over a decade now, I have been fighting within this Court for the extension of the material scope of jus cogens to cover the right to justice lato sensu. To my satisfaction, the Court has adopted the line of reasoning I have strongly advocated for years. Refreshing my memory, in my Separate Opinions in the Case of Blake v. Guatemala (preliminary objections, Judgment of Jul. 2, 1996;30 merits, Judgment of Jan. 24, 1998;31 and reparations, Judgment of Jan. 22, 199932) I referred to the need to develop the case law on jus cogens prohibitions (beyond the law of treaties, covering any violation of human rights, including by way of unilateral action, so as to establish in a crystal-clear fashion the objectively unlawful nature of torture practices, summary executions and forced disappearances). 36. In my Separate Opinion in the paradigmatic Case of the "Street Children" (VillagránMorales et al. v. Guatemala, Judgment on reparations of May 26, 2001), I argued that the protection of the fundamental right to life falls under the domain of jus cogens (para. 36); along the same lines of thought are my Concurring Opinion (para. 11) in the Case of Barrios Altos v. Perú (Judgment of Mar. 14, 2001) and my Separate Opinion (para. 6) in the Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia (Judgment on preliminary objections of Feb. 4, 2000). In my Separate Opinions (para. 38) in the cases of Hilaire, Benjamin and Constantine v. Trinidad and Tobago (Judgment on preliminary objections of Sep. 1, 2001), I made reference to the evolution of jus dispositivum into jus cogens (in the realm of the mandatory international jurisdiction). 37. I addressed the gradual broadening of the absolute prohibitions of jus cogens in my Separate Opinion (para. 34) in the Case of Servellón-García et al. v. Honduras (Judgment of Sep. 21, 2006). In the Judgment of Aug. 18, 2000 in the Case of Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, the Court made significant progress (from its initial position regarding the protection of the fundamental right to life) by holding that "(...) certain acts that were classified in the past as inhuman or degrading treatment, but not as torture, may be classified differently in the future, that is, as torture, since the growing demand for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms must be accompanied by a more vigorous response in dealing with infractions of basic values of democratic societies (…)” (para. 99). explaining how those who seem to lack expressions of will, such as newborns or those with certain mental inabilities, still are legal persons). In criticizing, in addition, the “never-ending debate” between both theories, Alf Ross characterized the “typical situation of a subjective right” by the “restriction of another person’s freedom, the power to institute legal action and the authority to adjudicate” the right. A. Ross, Sobre el Derecho y la Justicia, 2a. ed., Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1997, pp. 230-231 and 225. 30 . Paras. 11 and 14 of the Opinion. 31 . Paras. 15, 17, 23, 25 and 28 of the Opinion. 32 . Paras. 31, 40 and 45 of the Opinion.