─as in the instant Case of Blanco-Romero et al.─ that call for dissuasive reparations, precisely to ensure non-recurrence of such serious human rights violations. 9. As previously pointed out in my Separate Opinion in the Case of Myrna MackChang (2003), on the actual reparatio, "[contrary] to what the Inter-American Court maintained in the past,2 it is my view that reparations can perfectly well be both compensatory and punitive, with the aim of putting an end to impunity and ensuring realization of justice –which is perfectly in accordance with the current stage of development of international law." (para. 46) 10. Indeed, reparations of dissuasive or exemplary nature can already be found in the precedents of this Court. Thus, for instance, in the Case of Aloeboetoe v. Suriname (Judgment of September, 10, 1993), the Court ordered to reopen a school and establish a foundation to assist the beneficiaries. In the Case of Villagrán-Morales et al. v. Guatemala (case of the "Street Children," Judgment of May 26, 2001), the Court ordered once again that an education center be named after the victims of the case; similarly, in the Case of Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia (Judgment of February 27, 2002), the Court again ordered that an educational establishment be given the name of the victim. 11. I find particularly significant and exemplary the reparation measures aimed at recognizing the suffering of the victims and preserving their collective memory. We can mention at this point some other pertinent examples in precedents of the Court. In the Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru (Judgment of December 3, 2001), for instance, the Court ordered the State to provide a university-level educational scholarship to the victim. In the Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru (Judgment of November 30, 2001), the Court ordered reparations to be made effective through education-related benefits and payment of expenses for health services. 12. Moreover, in the Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru (Judgment of December 3, 2001), the Court once again ordered payment of health care services or expenses and psychological support. In the Case of Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala (Judgment of November 25, 2003), the Court ordered reparations3 of both compensatory and punitive nature, for dissuasive or exemplary purposes, in order to preserve the memory of the violations occurred, to satisfy (in the sense of serving the interests of justice) the next of kin of the victim, and to contribute to guarantee non-recurrence of such violations. 13. Such exemplary reparations are similar to “punitive damages” which, contrary to what some hasty authors aver, do exist. "Punitive damages" ─a notion which is not strange to comparative domestic case law and to arbitration international law4─ may, in . In the judgments on "compensatory damages" (of 1989) in the cases of Velásquez Rodríguez y Godínez Cruz, cit. supra n. (47). 2 . 3 Such as the ones in operative paragraphs 6 to 11 of the Judgment in that case. . Cf., for example, inter alia, R.W. Hodgin y E. Veitch, "Punitive Damages Reassessed", 21 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1972) pp. 119-132. There are even those who perceive a clear recognition of "punitive damages" in international law; cf., for example, N.H.B. Jorgensen, "A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law", 68 British Year Book of International Law (1997) pp. 247-266. And, for a draft of a jurisprudential construct, cf. G. 4