7 21. As for the second phase of the criminal case, the petitioners allege that Article 8(5) of the American Convention was violated by virtue of the fact that the verdict relied upon the testimony of anonymous witnesses and by the fact that their defense attorneys’ motion to not to keep their identity 17 confidential was denied. The petitioners contend that “these witnesses were crucial to the conviction, so much so that if one reads the verdict in its entirety, one would readily conclude that without these two 18 witnesses Mr. Pichún would not have been convicted.” They argue further that the failure to reveal the identity of the faceless witnesses to the defendants at the trial that took place when the Supreme Court vacated the original acquittal was a violation of the right to an effective defense, also protected under the Convention. 22. Petitioners Pascual Pichún and Aniceto Norín also argue that the manner in which their motions regarding the testimony of the faceless witnesses were processed was a violation of Article 8(2)(f) of the American Convention. They explain that at the trial, the Public Prosecutor’s Office asked to enter new evidence – the statement of witness José Pichincura Caniuqueo, a request the court granted without explaining why. Following the testimony of Protected Witness No. 1, and given the nature of his testimony, “the defense offered to enter new evidence that would disprove the witness’ testimony, prove that the witness was not impartial and was of dubious moral character, and fundamentally undermine the truth of his testimony, as the code of criminal procedure in force provides. After some debate, the court did not allow this new evidence, asserting only that the court had the authority to disallow evidence; it 19 gave no other grounds for its decision.” The petitioners contend that this was an arbitrary decision, contrary to the principle of equality of arms, especially inasmuch as it was evidence offered to counter the anonymous witness’ testimony. They also allege that in Consideranda 23, the court refuses to lift the shroud of secrecy surrounding the witness so that legal action can be brought against him for perjuring 20 himself. 23. The petitioners in the case of Victor Ancalaf also consider that the fact that the proceeding was not conducted in public and the identity of the witnesses upon whose testimony the 21 conviction rested was kept secret constituted a violation of the accused’ right of defense. 17 Petitioner Aniceto Norín argues that “during the hearing, the Court itself pointed out that under Article 19(3) of the Constitution, due process had to be observed, and that the identity of the witness had to be revealed to the defense. However, the Court’s statement of principles stopped there; it was an empty guarantee on two counts: because the defense attorneys were not permitted to reveal the identity of the witness to the defendants, which made the court’s decision on this point meaningless and did not allow proper exercise of the right of defense: if a defense attorney is unable to tell his client what the evidence against him is so as to get the details needed to stage a proper defense, then this due process is due process in name only, but not in fact or in practice; and because in consideranda 13 (p. 42) the court disallowed identification of protected witness No. 1, which meant that no legal action could be initiated against that witness. A court cannot shelter a criminal who commits the crime of perjury behind a decision that prevents the victim of the crime from exercising one of his essential rights, which is to denounce the crime.” Communication that attorney Rodrigo Lillo Vera sent to the IACHR on behalf of Aniceto Norín, received on December 23, 2003, pp. 10-11. 18 Observations of Aniceto Norín and Pascual Pichún on the merits of the matter before the IACHR, received on March 1, 2007, p. 20. 19 Communication from Pascual Pichún Paillalao supplementing the original petition he filed with the IACHR, received on June 21, 2004, p. 12; Communication from Aniceto Norín Catrimán supplementing the original petition he filed with the IACHR, received on July 12, 2004. 20 For the petitioners, “[e]verything recounted here is a violation of the right of the defendant in a criminal proceeding to obtain witness testimony from persons who are able to shed light on the facts; it was also a violation of the principle of equality before the law, because the various parties were treated differently: the private accuser and the Public Prosecutor’s Office were allowed to enter new evidence, without any explanation, while my defense counsel was not allowed to offer new evidence that would have proved that the statements made by one of the witnesses were false, the very witness whose testimony the court used to make its case that the crime of threats had been committed and that I was involved.” Communication from Pascual Pichún Paillalao supplementing the original petition he filed with the IACHR, and received on June 21, 2004, p. 13. Communication from Aniceto Norín Catrimán supplementing the original petition sent to the IACHR, received July 12, 2004. Observations of Aniceto Norín and Pascual Pichún on the merits of the matter before the IACHR, received on March 1, 2007, p. 19 21 “At the time of the commission of the acts for which Víctor Ancalaf was convicted, the new code of criminal procedure was still not in force in the Bío Bío region, so that the procedure followed in the case against the petitioner was the old system, which was inquisitorial in nature (…) The trial against Víctor Ancalaf, which was confidential and secret, was a “secret summary” proceeding for the defense attorneys during much of the investigation, seriously impairing their right to contest the background information that implicated him. (…) The inquisitorial proceeding against Víctor Ancalaf made it impossible to interrogate the