22 “The State continues with this policy of reparation and […] a second wave of official action came after […] some resounding judicial cases, [particularly] the imprisonment of General Contreras, who had been the chief of the Secret Police in Chile […], and the arrest of General Pinochet in London.” These cases “renewed public awareness of the unresolved issues regarding human rights, at the time of the so-called Mesa de Diálogo (Conversation Table)[,] another landmark of these efforts. The Armed Forces’ recognition of the harm caused meant not only that the truth about the most serious human rights violations was revealed, but also [...] that, for the first time in Chile, the truth was recognized by the authors of such violations.” “A third moment of official action […] came in 2003, when certain political events triggered a nationwide debate concerning the work done so far in the field of human rights, and the Government took action again to create a commission [i.e., the Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura (National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture), with] a public policy aimed at addressing this issue, first and foremost, by creating a Commission, popularly known as the Valech Commission after its president, whose task was analogue to that of the Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación (National Reparation and Reconciliation Corporation), but this time addressing those persons who had suffered political imprisonment and torture. [… I]t also furnished a general account and then tagged almost 30,000 cases […] as persons who had unjustly suffered political imprisonment or torture. Furthermore, on President Lagos’ initiative, the National Congress granted a reparation pension to each of them [...].” The witness deemed such reparation policy to be efficient, highlighting the fact that “the policy was actually put into practice: all promises made by the Government have been carried out. It has been a socially legitimate policy, in the sense that it has not been questioned. Even the victims’ next of kin have accepted it [...] thanks to the recognition of the harm caused.” In addition, he called the policy “an incremental reparation policy,” since it has included “more and more victims, sometimes raising monetary reparations, increasingly establishing landmarks and moments for the remembrance of the victims, with a high level of public acceptance.” “The Government as such never proposed any bill to set aside the Amnesty Decree Law, but several congressmen of the government coalition did so instead. [This] was rather a testimonial or political gesture, in the sense that it raised public awareness,” as there has never been a majority to do it. “Today for the first time, political forces have made a favorable shift towards repudiating the Amnesty Decree Law.” “No one ha[d] considered the possibility of declaring the law invalid because that was not part of the tradition; [...] Congress has never declared the invalidity of law,” and “the Constitutional Court now also has the power to declare the law invalid” with more stringent requirements. “The arguments for invalidating [the Amnesty Decree Law] have been strongly focused on [its] immorality, since it was issued by the authors of the crimes themselves.” It is immoral to “use a legal instrument to violate long-established principles of international law, at least with regard to the most serious crimes against humanity.” The arguments against invalidating the Amnesty Decree Law are as follows: Firstly, “if the rules created by the de facto governments in Chile were declared invalid, much [of the] legal system would collapse, including many of the rules that