2 4. It is common knowledge that there are different types of amnesty,171 “granted” under the pretext of achieving “national reconciliation” through the revelation of the “truth” (under the terms of the amnesty in question) and forgiveness; these pretexts, in practice have been individually or collectively used by some States.172 However, forgiveness cannot be imposed by a decree law or otherwise; instead, it can only be granted spontaneously by the victims themselves. And, in order to do so, they have sought justice. In this regard, the Court recalls in this Judgment that, when releasing to the public, on March 4, 1993, the final Report of the Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (National Truth and Reconciliation Commission) (of February 8, 1991), the President of Chile then incumbent, Mr. Patricio Aylwin, apologized to the victims’ next of kin, on behalf of the State (and the nation) as follows: “When those who caused so much suffering were officials of the State and the relevant government authorities could not or did not know how to prevent or punish them, nor was there the necessary social reaction to avert it, both the State and society as a whole are responsible, whether by act or by omission. It is the Chilean society who is in debt to the victims of human rights violations. (...) Therefore, in my capacity as President of the Republic, I dare to speak for the entire nation and, in its name, 173 apologize to the next of kin of the victims.” 5. Over the past years, research has been conducted on the different types of amnesty; however, there is no need to discuss this aspect further here. Notwithstanding, given the circumstances surrounding the cas d'espèce, it is relevant to focus on a specific type of amnesty: the so-called “self-amnesty,” which seeks to shelter those responsible for gross human rights violation from justice, thus promoting impunity. To start with, it is important to remember that true laws may not be arbitrary; they do not bear the name of those who hold themselves above them. They have some level of abstraction, essential to the operation of law. They embody principles, which form and inform them, and are apprehended by human reason, i.e. the recta ratio, and give them a life of their own. They give expression to everlasting values. As pointed out in a famous study of statutory construction, “Laws remain identical to themselves, while the ever-changing course of history 174 and life flows beneath them.” 171 . Cf. e.g. L. Joinet (rapporteur), “Study on Amnesty Laws,” document No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16/Rev.1, Geneva, UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1985, pp. 1-22; J. Gavron, “Amnesties in the Light of Developments in International Law and the Establishment of the International Criminal Court,” 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2002) pp. 91-117. 172 . A. O'Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice, The Hague, Kluwer, 2004, p. 23, and cf. pp. 25-33. 173 . Cit. in para. 81(26) of this Judgment. P. Aylwin-Azocar, “La Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación de Chile” (National Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Chile), in Estudios Básicos de Derechos Humanos - II (eds. A.A. Cançado-Trindade and L. González-Volio), San José de Costa Rica, IIDH, 1995, pp. 105-119. 174 . S. Soler, La Interpretación de la Ley, Barcelona, Publ. Ariel, 1962, p. 108, and cf. pp. 15, 115, 117, and 143.