CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGIO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ IN RELATION TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CASE OF USÓN RAMÍREZ V. VENEZUELA, OF NOVEMBER 20, 2009 1. In this judgment, to which I agree with and cast my concurring opinion, the Inter-American Court defined a criterion, which it had profiled previously, but not developed in a timely fashion with its natural consequences. In different occasions I have maintained the relevance of adopting this criterion in the analysis and decision making of a case, from a due process standpoint, when the fundamental problem lies in lack of the information in the heading of Article 8 of the American Convention: the actions of a competent, independent, and impartial Tribunal, as a fundamental right of the defendant. 2. it is known ---and the Court has so stated-- that due process is about the concurrence of diverse elements, whose presence ensures access to justice, an individual’s ample defense, effective representation, –all in all--- the protection of rights and freedoms through prosecution. In this sense, due process constitutes a condition, or an indispensable tool, for the protection of rights. Concurrence of diverse elements within the frame of due process does not mean however that they are of equal nature and that their absence or detriment will yield identical outcomes in the prosecution. 3. Most cases brought to the Inter-American Court include issues related to due process, in a broad sense, which for sure is not compacted to its main frame –article 8 of the American Convention—but it rather cites specific applications from other precepts, such as Article 4, regarding rights surrounding the death penalty; 5, regarding integrity; 7, regarding freedom, and 25, concerning procedural protections of fundamental rights, which is not necessarily absorbed, incorporated, or subsumed in Article 8. 4. It is important to distinguish –-as the Court is now doing-- between different issues encompassed under the title “Right to a Fair Trial” of Article 8 which can be associated, for this purpose, with the concept of due process. On the one hand, paragraph 1, refers to a broader right, of a very general reach, which comes to light in the procedural solution – definition of rights and determination of obligations – in all kinds of controversies, regardless of subject matter and specialty stemming from it, of the jurisdictional authority who will adopt the final decision. I am referring to the right of every person to be heard by a judge or an independent and impartial tribunal, which is his or her competent tribunal, with observance of determined rights and within a reasonable timeframe. 5. On the other hand, paragraph 2 of the same Article, contains a list of rights addressing the criminal prosecution, those of which acquire a special meaning under the so called presumption -- or principle -- of innocence. The Court’s jurisprudence has highlighted: a) that this catalogue constitutes a minimal relationship --as the very concept states --, clearly subject to a pro persona extension thru national or international codifications and also thru interpreted jurisprudence, and b) the rights listed in this paragraph can be applied to situations which are not of a criminal nature, to the extent that they are pertinent and based on the nature of the proceeding to which they are transferred. The progress of the Inter-American Court has leaned on this two way direction which has also revised –-another recent advance—the points of reference to evaluate the reasonableness inherent to the term mentioned on article 8(1)