7 Commission and that the Commission infringed the procedural balance and the right to defense of the State given that it did not clearly state the purpose of the hearing held on March 13, 2006; some of the facts considered in the report on admissibility were provided by the petitioner without having forwarded them to the State, in violation of the State’s opportunity to object to them, and paragraph 46 of the report on admissibility clearly shows the “lack of agreement between the facts described as basis of the report and the ones [..] that led the Commission to determine the merits of whether to apply the exception.” 15. In particular, the State alleged that the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies refers to those related to: (a) Resolution 7306 of December 6, 2002, issued by the National Office of Immigration and Naturalization of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice of Panama (hereinafter, “National Office of Immigration”), by which the punishment of imprisonment was imposed on the alleged victim; and (b) the complaint and investigation of the alleged acts of torture committed against him. Regarding Resolution 7306 of December 6, 2002, the State mentioned that the remedies that existed under Panamanian law, at the time of the events, for the review of said administrative act, were the Request for Reconsideration and Appeal, the Appeal for Administrative Review, the Appeal for Protection of Human Rights, the Writ of Amparo, and the Writ of Habeas Corpus. According to the State, all the remedies above mentioned were in full force and effect, were effective to exercise the right to judicial protection, and were accessible to the petitioner. Regarding the alleged acts of torture, the State sustained that Mr. Vélez Loor did not file a complaint or claim in that respect, despite having had access to the relevant mechanisms and opportunities to do so. 16. As for the appropriate procedural moment, the State indicated that the notices of non-compliance with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies were given at the first stages of the proceeding before the Commission and given that “the State never stopped alleging the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, […] it cannot be sustained there is a tacit waiver of the State’s right to raise [...] this objection." ii. Arguments of the Commission 17. The Commission alleged that the arguments put forward by the State are timebarred. In that respect, it sustained that even though in the first response of Panama of March 6, 2006, reference was made to Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention, “the State did not put forward any argument addressed to sustain the non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies in the specific case or to explain the remedies that were at the victim’s disposal and might have been considered suitable and effective in view of the facts alleged in the petition.” Furthermore, it noted that at the hearing held on March 13, 2006, the State “mentioned separately some remedies or ‘mechanisms’ to which the [alleged] victim could have resorted”; nevertheless, “before the Inter-American Court [it submitted] a broader list of specific remedies that cannot be considered equivalent to the ones presented before the [Commission].” iii. Arguments of the Representatives 18. For their part, the representatives pointed out that “with the exception of the writ of habeas corpus, the State did not allege the existence of [the] remedies [mentioned in the answer to the application] at the admissibility stage in the proceeding before the Inter-American Commission.” Moreover, they sustained that “regarding the mistreatment and acts of torture of which Mr. Vélez was [allegedly] a victim, [that] the State d[id] not expressly refer to which remedies would have been suitable and adequate.”