36 after the arrest, the National Police of Darien Zone placed Mr. Vélez Loor at the disposal of the Office of Immigration and Naturalization by means of Official letter N° ZPD/SDIIP 192-02.113 The Court understands that placing someone at the disposal of an authority does not necessarily mean bringing someone before the Director of the Immigration Office. Certainly, as has been established, in order to satisfy the requirement of Article 7(5) of “being brought” without delay before a judge or other officer authorized by law to carry out the judicial functions, the competent authority must hear the detained person personally and evaluate all the explanations that the latter provides, in order to decide whether to proceed to release him or to maintain the deprivation of liberty.114 110. Moreover, the Court notes that, once Mr. Vélez Loor was transferred to Metetí, a form was filled out, titled “filiación,” with his personal information [particulars] and the reasons why he was in Panama.115 It does not appear from this act that Mr. Vélez Loor had received a written notification of the alternatives that said Decree Law established, pursuant to Article 58 therein, in relation to the obligation he had to legalize his stay in the country or abandon it by his own means, within a minimum reasonable term of three (3) days and a maximum term of thirty (30) days, without detriment to the other established penalties. In addition, there is no record of the position of the officer who filled out the document and, as consequence, whether he or she had evaluated all the explanations that Mr. Vélez Loor was able to provide in order to decide whether to proceed to release him or to maintain the deprivation of liberty, or if he or she had the power to decide about the continuity of the detention or the release of Mr, Vélez Loor. 111. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal considers that the State has not provided sufficient elements that demonstrate that it has complied with the terms established in Article 7(5) of the Convention. b) Arrest warrant 1430 of November 12, 2002 112. The Commission argued that the arrest of Mr. Vélez Loor was arbitrary, from the moment of the issuance of the arrest warrant on November 12, 2002, to the moment of his deportation on September 10, 2003. In the Commission’s opinion, the arrest is only acceptable on the basis of an individualized evaluation and to comply with a legitimate State interest, “like ensuring the appearance of a person to the proceeding in order to determine the immigration status and possible deportation.” Furthermore, it sustained that the “threat to public security” could only be based on “exceptional circumstances in which there are serious indicia of the risk a person represents.” In this respect, the Commission pointed out that there is no reference in the decision of November 12, 2002 to “the specific situation of the [alleged] victim, the reasons why the detention was acceptable instead of another less detrimental measure, or the reasons why Mr. Vélez Loor represented a risk to the security or public order; [therefore] it was arbitrary.” The only justification for the decision was that Mr. Vélez Loor’s presence was “unlawful” for reasons of “security and public order.” disposal of the Director of the Immigration Department of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice within (24) hours." Cf. Decree Law No. 16 of June 30, 1960, supra note 80, folio 1152. 113 Cf. Order No. ZPD/SDIIP 192-02, supra note 67; Note No. DNMYN-AL-32-04, supra note 70; Report of the General Director of the National Police of Panama, supra note 69; Arrest Warrant No. 1430DNMYN-SI, supra note 70. 114 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez, supra note 99, para. 85, and Case of Bayarri, supra note 27, para. 65. 115 Cf. Particulars of Mr. Vélez Loor, supra note 71.