86 strictly reserved to active-duty military members, based on a previous case wherein it noted that “when [the] proceedings [against the victim] were started and heard, [he was] a retired military member, and therefore, could not be trie[d] by the military courts.”194 Chile, as a democratic State, must respect the restrictive and exceptional scope of military courts, and exclude the trial of civilians from the jurisdiction thereof. 140. The description of the criminal offenses of disobedience and breach of military duty as contained in the Code of Military Justice provides that the perpetrator must have “military status.” In this regard, the Court considers that Mr. PalamaraIribarne, as a retired officer, did not have the “military status required to be the perpetrator of the criminal offenses charged, and therefore, the above military criminal provisions were not applicable to the accused. Furthermore, the Court considers that Mr. Palamara-Iribarne, at the time he wrote the book and set in motion its publication, did so in the legitimate exercise of his right to express his opinions and ideas freely. 141. The Court considers that Chile has not adopted the necessary measures for Mr. Palamara-Iribarne to be tried by ordinary courts, since as a civilian he did not have the military status required to be deemed the perpetrator of a military criminal offense. The Court notes that, in Chile, establishing that a person has military status is a complex task which requires the interpretation of various provisions and regulations, which allowed the judicial authorities who applied them to make a broad interpretation of the concept of “military” in order to subject Mr. Palamara-Iribarne to the military courts. 142. Such broad jurisdiction of military courts in Chile, which allows them to hear cases which should be heard by civilian courts, is not in line with Article 8(1) of the American Convention. 143. The Court has pointed out that “[w]here the military courts find themselves competent to hear cases which should be heard by ordinary courts, the right to be tried by a competent judge or court is violated, and so is, a fortiori, due process, which, in turn, is closely related to the right to a fair trial.”195 The trial of civilians is incumbent on the ordinary justice. 144. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the State has violated Article 8(1) of the Convention to the detriment of Mr. Palamara-Iribarne, as he was tried by courts which were not competent to do so, and that it has violated the general duty to respect and guarantee the rights and freedoms enshrined by Article 1(1) of the Convention. Furthermore, as the Chilean domestic legislation comprises provisions which oppose the right to a hearing by a competent judge or court as provided in Article 8(1) of the Convention and which are still in full force and 194 195 Cf. Case of Cesti-Hurtado, supra note 193, para. 151. Cf. Case of Lori Berenson-Mejía, supra note 191, para. 141; Case of 19 Tradesmen. Judgment of July 5, 2004. Series C No. 109, para. 167; and Case of Las Palmeras. Judgment of December 6, 2001. Series C No. 90, para. 52.