State “recognizes cohabiting same-sex couples for limited purposes, but does not offer them the possibility of registration.” With reference to the material, parental and other consequences, the ECHR states that “the legal consequences of registered partnership vary from almost equivalent to marriage to giving relatively limited rights.” The ECHR then considers the general principles and their application to the specific case, and finally examines the applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 and the allegation that it had been violated. 10. General principles. The ECHR recalls that, according to its established case-law, “Article 12 secures the fundamental right of a man and a woman to marry and to found a family,” and that the exercise of this right “gives rise to personal, social and legal consequences.” Although it is subject to the national laws of the Contracting States, “the limitations thereby introduced must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired” (para. 49). Furthermore, the ECHR observes that it “has not yet had an opportunity to examine whether two persons who are of the same sex can claim to have a right to marry,” but that “certain principles might be derived” from its case-law relating to transsexuals, which initially found that “the attachment to the traditional concept of marriage which underpins Article 12 provided sufficient reason for the continued adoption by the respondent State of biological criteria for determining a person’s sex for the purposes of marriage” (paras. 50-51). In the Christine Goodwin6 case, the Court departed from that case-law, noting that there had been “major social changes in the institution of marriage” since the adoption of the Convention, citing Article 9 of the European Charter and, taking into consideration the “widespread acceptance of the marriage of transsexuals in their assigned gender,” found that “the terms used in Article 12… no longer had to be understood as determining gender by purely biological criteria.” Consequently, “the impossibility for a post-operative transsexual to marry in her assigned gender violated Article 12” (para. 52). In two other cases concerning marriages between a woman and a male-to-female transsexual,7 the ECHR had determined (para. 53) that the complaint concerning the legal requirement to end their marriage in order for the transsexual to “obtain full legal recognition of her change of gender” was “manifestly illfounded.” The ECHR noted that “domestic law only permitted marriage between persons of opposite gender, whether such gender is derived from attribution at birth or from a gender recognition procedure, while same-sex marriages were not permitted,” and that “Article 12 enshrined the traditional concept of marriage as being between a man and a woman.” Although the Court acknowledged that “several Contracting States had extended marriage to include same-sex couples,” it noted that “this reflected their own vision [of said States] of the role of marriage in their societies” but “did not flow from an interpretation of the fundamental right enshrined, as laid down ….in the Convention in 1950”. Therefore, it fell “within the State’s margin of appreciation how to regulate the effects of the change of gender on pre-existing marriages.” Furthermore, if the applicants should opt to divorce, they would have the possibility to enter into a civil partnership, something that “contributed to the proportionality of the gender recognition regime complained of.” 11. Application to the specific case. The ECHR stated that Article 12 grants the right to marry to “men and women,” (“l´homme et la femme”) and, although the wording of said Article taken in isolation could be interpreted as “to exclude a marriage between two men or two women,” considered in the context it should be borne in mind that, “in contrast, all other substantive Articles of the Convention grant rights and freedoms to “everyone” or 6 Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (no. 28957/95), Grand Chamber Judgment, July 11, 2002. 7 Parry v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 42971/05, ECHR 2006-XV, and R. and F. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 35748/05, November 28, 2006. 4