state that “no one” may be subjected to certain types of prohibited treatment.” The choice of the words “men and women” should be considered “deliberate”, particularly in “the historical context” of the 1950s decade, when “marriage was clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between partners of different sex.” As regards the “connection between the right to marry and the right to found a family,” in the case of Christine Goodwin the ECHR reached the conclusion that “the inability of any couple to conceive or parent a child” does not exclude per se the right to marry. However, this finding “does not allow for any conclusion regarding the issue of same-sex marriage” (para. 56). Although “the Convention is a living instrument which is to be interpreted in present-day conditions,” and the institution of marriage “has undergone major social changes,” the ECHR noted that “there is no European consensus regarding same-sex marriages,” which are only permitted in six out of 47 States Party to the Convention (para. 58). The case under consideration should be distinguished from the Christine Goodwin case, which had recognized “a convergence of standards concerning the marriage of transsexuals in their assigned gender” and involved a “marriage between partners who are of different gender,” if this is not defined by purely biological criteria (para. 59). [Thus, the ECHR was agreeing with the assertion of the non-governmental organizations intervening in the case, according to which “while the Court had often underlined that the Convention was a living instrument that should be interpreted in present-day conditions, it had only used that approach to develop its jurisprudence when it had perceived a convergence of standards among Member States”.] 12. Influence of Article 9 of the European Charter. As to Article 9 of the European Charter (explained in the official commentary), the deliberate elimination of the reference to “men and women” makes the provision broader in its scope that the corresponding articles in other human rights instruments, but “the reference to domestic law reflects the diversity of national regulations, which range from allowing same-sex marriage to explicitly forbidding it” and leaving any decisions on this matter to the States8 (para. 60). Having regard to Article 9 of the Charter, the ECHR concluded that “would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex,” for which reason said Article was applicable to the case, but emphasized that “the question of whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national laws” of each State (para. 61). The Court noted that “marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ largely from one society to another,” and that the ECHR “must not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of that of the national authorities, who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society” (para. 62). Consequently, it found that “Article 12 of the Convention does not impose an obligation on the respondent Government to grant a same-sex couple like the applicants access to marriage” (para. 63), and ruled that there had been no violation of said Article (para. 64). 13. Applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. According to the ECHR, “Article 149 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions” (para. 89). In several judgments (the last of which was in 2001 10), the ECHR had held that “the notion of 8 According to the commentary, “it may be argued that there is no obstacle to recognizing same-sex relationships in the context of marriage,” but there is “no explicit requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such marriages” 9 For the text, see note 1. 10 Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), no. 56501/00, ECHR 2001-VI, May 10, 2001. 5