of Treaties, hereinafter the Vienna Convention, namely, the rules relating to good faith, the terms of the treaty, the context of those terms, and the object and purpose.8 1.- Good faith. The "bona fides" applies from the assumption that States Parties to the Convention intended to use it and, in what pertains to said kind, include in it Article 23(2). In that sense, what the Judgment does is discover or scrutinize what they, as the creators of the regulation, in this regard actually agreed upon, deeming that this agreement leads to, according to the principle "pacta sunt servanda,"9 the obligation to comply with that being agreed upon, even with primacy to what the respective national or domestic laws provide. 10 It is for this reason that it did not proceed to invoke in orders, domestic legislation and jurisprudence of the State concerned nor of other States also Parties to the Convention, let alone an assumed primacy of national law over International law,11 as background to argue the compatibility with Article 23(2),12 because the intention was precisely to determine whether these laws are consistent and conform to the requirements of the latter. 2.- The terms. That agreed upon by the States Parties to the Convention is stated, moreover, in the terms used in Article 23(2), namely, the wording, “only” and “sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings,” without providing, however, “a special meaning”13, but rather, to the contrary, an “ordinary” meaning, with the purpose of expressing what is regularly or normally intended by them. It turns out that the word "only" means, pursuant to the Spanish Language Dictionary,14 "that which excludes or has the force and virtue to exclude" or "exclusive, single, excluding any other" from which it follows that the grounds or reasons for the Law to regulate the exercise of political rights are solely those set out in that Article, wherein "“sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings,” is stated. Certainly, if the States Parties to the Convention had wanted to enshrine in Article 23(2) the specific grounds for regulating the rights and opportunities referred to in Article 23(1) therein or allow sentencing by another court or other judicial body distinct from a criminal court or in proceedings similar to criminal ones, they would have said so expressly or directly or would have used different terminology, for example, “such 8 Art.31(1):”A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 9 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” 10 Article 27 of the same Convention: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” 11 See paragraph 103 of this Judgment. 12 See paragraph 105 of this Judgment. 13 Art.31(4) of the Vienna Convention: “A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” 14 Real Academia Española, Vigésima segunda edición, Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2001. (definition does not pertain to English translation). 2