shown. The latter call for sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt about impartiality.25 23. In the case of the personal character of impartiality, this means, in short, that the judge has the ability to take the necessary distance, and that he resists succumbing to any subjective influences.26 In this regard, the ECHR ha indicated that judges must even be careful about any expressions that might suggest a negative assessment of the claims of one of the parties. 27 The notion of an impartial court, interpreted in the sense of the absence of prejudice or of preconceptions, includes, in the first place, a subjective analysis in order to delimit the personal conviction and conduct of a judge in a specific case and, then, an objective analysis to ensure that there are sufficient guarantees to allow the accused to eliminate any legitimate doubt.28 Personal impartiality is presumed unless there is proof to the contrary; however, owing to the significant difficulty of obtaining this type of evidence 29 – a circumstance that, in our opinion, is not present in this case – the contrary cannot always be proved. 24. Meanwhile, with regard to the functional nature of impartiality, it is necessary to verify whether, regardless of the personal attitude of the judge, there are verifiable objective circumstances that could cast suspicions on his impartiality. The point of view of the interested person, without constituting an essential factor, should be taken into account; but the decisive factor consists in assessing whether the accused’s misgivings about the judge can be considered objectively justified. 30 With regard to impartiality, even appearances can have some importance and, consequently, “any judge regarding whom there is a legitimate reason to doubt his lack of impartiality should be disqualified.”31 25. In European case law, the limits of both notions are open-ended, in view of the fact that a specific conduct of a judge — from the viewpoint of an external observer — may raise objectively justified doubts concerning his impartiality, but may also raise such doubts with regard to his personal conviction. Thus, in order to distinguish them, it should be understood that the first situation (the objective one) is of a functional nature and includes the hypothesis in which the personal conduct of the judge, without being called into question, shows signs that could raise justified doubts about the impartiality of the court that must try the case.32 In this regard, appearances can be 25 García Roca, Javier and Vidal Zapatero, José Miguel, op. cit. p. 378. 26 Casadevall, Josep, op. cit., p. 282. 27 Cf. ECHR. Case of Lavents v. Latvia, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) Court (First Section), Application No. 58442/00, Judgment of 28 November 2002, para. 118. 28 Cf. ECHR. Case of Piersack v. Belgium, Judgment (Merits), Court (Chamber), Application No. 8692/79, Judgment of 1 October 1982, para. 30. 29 García Roca, Javier and Vidal Zapatero, José Miguel, op. cit. p. 381. 30 Casadevall, Josep, op. cit., p. 282. 31 ECHR. Case of Piersack v. Belgium, Judgment (Merits), Court (Chamber), Application No. 8692/79 8692/79, Judgment of 1 October 1982, para. 30; and Case of Castillo Algar v. Spain, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), Court (Chamber) Application No. 28194/95 28194/95, Judgment of 28 October 1998, para. 45. 32 Casadevall, Josep, op. cit. p. 286. 8