affirmed that all its considerations also related to the offense of terrorist threats. Furthermore, it indicated that “the existence of an imprecise definition of a criminal offense […] is confirmed by the existence of at least three subsequent trials for the same fire as in the Poluco Pidenco case,” citing other offenses. It considered that the wording of article 1 “does not refer [to its] content,” and that “what is involved are criminal offenses that are open to the use of judicial discretion over and above […] the proper exercise of interpretation.” It explained that any ordinary offense can instill fear so that, by not differentiating that intent from one of “producing terror or intimidating a population or similar wording,” the intent established in article 1 of the Counterterrorism Act does not allow ordinary offenses to be distinguished from those of a terrorist nature, because the law should have established the level of fear required for an offense to be of a terrorist nature. It asserted that the definition of the offense did not establish “the [means] that should be punished,” and that “the law does not clarify the level of premeditation and planning that converts an ordinary offense into a terrorist offense.” It also indicated that “only the intent to cause death or severe bodily injury should be included as intent in terrorist offenses.” Furthermore, the FIDH argued that, since the convictions were based “on contextual presumptions about terrorist intent,” they were incompatible with the principle of individual criminal responsibility, because the presumed victims were held responsible “for acts carried out by unknown persons, and [their] guilt was inferred because they belonged […] to the Mapuche people.” b) CEJIL affirmed that definitions of terrorist offenses should be worded “so as to avoid arbitrary and subjective interpretations.” It stated that international law does not include a definition of terrorism, but rather “basic elements” that allow “certain acts related to different dimensions of this international crime to be described,” which, based on the “necessary technical precision, will exclude the possibility of a distorted application of the term “terrorism,” using it, for example, as a response to social demands or movements.” It also included some considerations on the incompatibility with the principle of legality of the offense of “[t]o place, throw or fire bombs, or explosive or incendiary devices of any type that affect or may affect the physical integrity of persons or cause damage” and its relationship to the presumption of a terrorist intent of article 1 of Law 18,314. It affirmed that the presumption of intent to instill fear had the effect of inverting the burden of proof “and freed the Chilean State from its obligation to prove […] the guilt of the accused,” and that this “does not ensure […] legal certainty.” It stated that linking “the nature and effects of the means used” leaves to the “criterion of the prosecutor the ad hoc determination of the means [that are terrorist means].” It also indicated that “the definition in article 2 of the law of the other circumstances that determine that an offense is terrorist in nature […] is not consistent with the principle of legality either.” CEJIL also included specific considerations on the act described in article 2.4 of Law No. 18,314, the criminal act of which Víctor Ancalaf Llaupe was convicted, and affirmed that the expression “incendiary devices of any type” is imprecise, and that it is not consistent with the model wording proposed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur which “focuses on the protection of life and personal integrity.” It stated that, insofar as any fire causes damage “however limited,” if the presumption under article 1 of the Counter-terrorism Act is applied, the effect of this article is that “any fire would necessarily constitute a terrorist offense.” 158. The State affirmed that the Counter-terrorism Act complies with the principle of legality and that, under its article 1, a “terrorist criminal intent” is required, expressed by a “special purpose” of the perpetrator “to instill justified fear in the population or part of it that it may fall victim to offenses of the same type,” and that it is this subjective terrorist element, added to the perpetration of any of the criminal acts described in article 2 of the law, that constitutes a terrorist offense. It indicated that, even though there is no “consensus in legal doctrine or in international law on a definition of […] terrorism,” the one most accepted is that 54