arson codified in article 476.3 of the Criminal Code,164 which defines the act of “to set fire to […] forests, standing crops, pastures, woodland, hedges or plantations.” Juan Patricio and Florencio Jaime Marileo Saravia, Messrs. Huenchunao Mariñán and Millacheo Licán and Ms. Troncoso Robles were convicted as perpetrators of the offense of terrorist arson based on a fire on the Poluco Pidenco property (supra paras. 126 and 128). The Lonkos Norín Catrimán and Pichún Paillalao were convicted of the “threat”165 to commit arson (“threat of terrorist arson”) (supra paras. 116 and 118), and b.ii) On the other hand, paragraphs 2 to 5 of article 2 (article 2.2 to 2.5) codified a series of acts or conducts as offenses without referring to preexisting offenses defined in the Criminal Code (supra para. 98). Mr. Ancalaf Llaupe was considered to be responsible for the criminal acts described in paragraph 4 (“To place, throw or fire bombs or explosive or incendiary devices of any type that affect or may affect the physical integrity of persons or cause damage”). 160. The Court will make some considerations on the content of the principle of legality, with special emphasis on the necessary distinction between ordinary offenses and terrorist offenses, and will then rule on the allegations of the violation of this principle owing to the definitions contained in the Counter-terrorism Act, as most relevant in order to decide this case. 1. The principle of legality in general and in relation to the codification of terrorist acts 161. The principle of legality according to which “[n]o one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense under the applicable law at the time it was committed” (Article 9 of the American Convention) constitutes a central element of criminal prosecution in a democratic society.166 The classification of an act as illegal and the establishment of its legal effects must pre-exist the action of the person who is considered the wrongdoer because, otherwise, the individual would be unable to adapt their actions to a legal order in force and certain that expresses social condemnation and the consequences of this.167 162. The classification of offenses requires a clear definition of the criminalized act that establishes its elements and allows it to be distinguished from acts that are not penalized or illegal acts that may be punished by non-criminal measures.168 The sphere of application of 164 Article 476 of the Criminal Code in force at the time of the acts for which the presumed victims in this case were prosecuted established that: “The following shall be punished with long-term rigorous imprisonment at any of its levels: 1. Anyone who shall set fire to a building destined to serve as a home that was not inhabited at the time. 2. Anyone who, in a village, shall set fire to any building or premises, even though this was not ordinarily destined to serve as a dwelling. 3. Anyone who shall set fire to woods, standing crops, pastures, woodlands, hedges or plantations.” 165 The pertinent part of Article 7 of the Counter-terrorism Act established that “the serious and credible threat of the perpetration of one of the said offenses shall be punished as an attempt to commit it.” 166 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 107, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2012 Series C No. 255, para. 130. 167 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 106, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina, para. 131. 168 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 121, and Case of Pacheco Teruel et al. v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 27, 2012 Series C No. 241, para. 105. 56