defense,” stating that the adversarial principle entails the right of the defendant to examine the witnesses who testify for and against him, under the same conditions. It indicated that “[t]he inquisitorial procedure held against [Mr. Ancalaf Llaupe] prevented him from examining the witnesses who incriminated him when they were testifying, leaving the defense in a situation of evident procedural imbalance,” which “was aggravated by the use of anonymous witnesses,” and because he was “convicted based on testimony provided in secret files.” It stated that “there is no evidence in the case file” that the defense of Víctor Ancalaf Llaupe were able to examine and cross-examine witnesses who had testified during the preliminary proceedings. It indicated that “the use of anonymous witnesses must be duly justified and counterbalance adequately [in order to] protect the right of defense.” It affirmed that “[n]either the exceptional use of the mechanism [of anonymous witnesses], nor the existence of a real danger was proved during the proceedings.” CEJIL also affirmed that the State had violated Article 8(2)(f) of the Convention to the detriment of Mr. Ancalaf Llaupe because the possibility of his defense counsel “obtaining evidence during the plenary proceedings was almost inexistent” and “he did not have a real and effective right to answer the charges and evidence against him.” 240. The State indicated that “the possibility of establishing measures of protection for certain witnesses in criminal cases is consequent with the obligation to safeguard the right to life and physical integrity of [the] individual.” Nevertheless, “to ensure that [this] cannot affect the right of defense substantively, it must observe certain conditions that also allow this right to be safeguarded.” It affirmed that both general procedural laws and the Counterterrorism Act permit “the cross-examination of witnesses and expert witnesses, even those whose identity is kept confidential,” with the restrictions imposed by article 18 of the latter to the effect that questions may not be asked that “entail a risk of revealing the identity [of the witness],” and indicated that the courts “know the identity of the witness and are able to assess the reliability of his testimony, [because, based on the] principle of immediacy that governs the criminal procedural system, every witness or expert witness is examined before [the courts].” It also affirmed that this measure is subject to “prior control,” because a request must be made to the guarantees judge together with the respective justification “based on the risk to the safety of the witness or his family.” It indicated that this type of testimony is assessed by the oral trial court under its obligation to provide the reasoning for its conclusions, and that “it is possible that the respective court may rely on the testimony of one or more anonymous witnesses, together with other evidence provided, if applicable, to convince it fully of the participation of the defendant in the acts that he is accused of, without this being, in itself, contrary to the right to due process or to the international standards.” 3. Considerations of the Court 241. On previous occasions the Court has ruled on violations of the right of the defense to examine witnesses in cases dealing with measures that, under the military criminal justice system, imposed an absolute prohibition to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution,262 others in which there were not only “faceless witnesses” but also “faceless judges,”263 and another that referred to a political trial held before Congress in which the defendant judges were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses on whose testimony their dismissal was based.264 262 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, paras.178 and 179. 263 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits, reparations and costs, paras. 153 to 155; Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru, para.184; Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, para.152, and Case of J. v. Peru, paras. 208 a 210. 264 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, para. 83. 85