freedom of expression, since it does not establish clear parameters to define the
prohibited conducts and their elements. 50
70. The Chilean legal system– more specifically the Criminal Code- differentiates
between slander (Articles 412 to 415) and insults (Articles 416 to 420), and also
contains provisions common to both offenses (Articles 421 to 431). Note that the
crime of insult is actually composed of two criminal offenses, namely: minor insults,
provided for in Article 416 and whose penalty is established in Article 419; and
serious insults, established in Article 417 and whose penalty is established in Article
418.
71. This does not mean that conduct which in other legal systems could be classified
as defamation is not criminalized. In fact, it is contemplated in the criminal offense
of insult, 51 more specifically in the offense of serious insult (Article 417). 52
Considering that the Chilean court convicted the petitioner for the latter offense, it
is important to analyze the wording of the provision:
ARTICLE 417.
Serious insults consist of:
1. The imputation of a crime or simple offense that does not give rise
to ex officio proceedings.
2. The imputation of a punishable or prescribed crime or simple
offense.
3. The imputation of a vice or lack of morality whose consequences
may significantly harm the reputation, credit or interests of the victim.
4. Insults that by their nature, occasion or circumstances are
understood by the public as affronts.
5. Those that rationally deserve the classification of serious due to the
status, dignity and circumstances of the offended party and the
offender.
72. The Inter-American Court considers that the criminal offense in question suffers
from a high degree of imprecision, especially Article 417, paragraphs 4 and 5, since
the circumstances that would make the insult “serious” or an ���affront” are not
specified. The same is true of paragraph 3, given the vagueness of the expression
"vice or lack of morality.” These criminal definitions are also problematic because,
in theory, they allow for the punishment of the attribution of true facts.
73. This is also the technical-legal opinion issued by Martín Prats, the expert witness
offered by the petitioner’s representatives, who stated the following during the
public hearing held on June 20, 2022: 53
Regarding the principle of legality, the provisions cited and on
which the judgments of the Chilean courts were based,
namely, Articles 416 and 417(3) of the Criminal Code, do not
meet the requirements of clarity and accuracy in defining the
proscribed conduct that would allow the defendant to know and
understand the prohibition and thus to anticipate it. This is also
similar to the Court’s ruling in the case of Canese v. Paraguay
of 2004, where it expressly stated that laws that establish
Merits Report (evidence file, fl. 28-30)
On this legislative option cf. MONTT, Mario Garrido. Derecho Penal Parte Especial, Tome III, Third ed.,
Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 2007, p. 187.
52
“Defamatory insult” even includes conduct that in other legal systems falls within the criminal definition of
defamation, since it is defined as “the imputation of a crime or simple offense that does not give rise to an ex
officio proceeding” (Art. 417, para. 1) and “imputation of a punishable or prescribed crime or simple offense”
(Art. 417, para. 2). This differentiation occurs because the crime of slander consists of the “imputation of a
specific but false crime that may currently be prosecuted ex officio.” (Art. 412).
53
Statement of Martín Prats before the Court at the public hearing on June 20, 2022.
50
51