75. Recalling Hassemer’s lesson, the indiscriminate use of vague concepts in criminal law, or concepts that rely on complementary assessments, often require judges to make decisions based on their own moral convictions to complete the semantic scope of the norm, giving them ample room to act without the guidance of the law. 60 According to the author, “the possibilities of binding the judge to the law (and verifying this fact) depend on the law itself. Generic and imperfect rules are much less likely to be binding on the judge than those that fully and precisely say what they mean.” 61 76. Thus, the failure to clearly define the criminal offense not only undermines the principle of legality as a corollary of the requirement of certainty or specificity, but also, reflexively, violates the right to freedom of expression, since it restricts the range of statements and publications that a citizen can make without fear of being criminally sanctioned. 77. Based on the above reasons, we agree with the judgment in recognizing that the aforementioned provisions violate Article 9 of the Convention. However, there are two elements of the legal system that constitute the factual framework of the case which deserve a closer look and are inextricably related to the mechanisms of containment of the right to freedom of expression analyzed here: (i) the criminal aggravating factor consisting of the use of the media, provided for in Article 29 of Law Nº19.733 and (ii) the aggravating factor related to the offended party’s status as a public official, provided for in Article 12 (13) of the Chilean Criminal Code. b. Incompatibility with the American Convention and the case law of the Inter-American Court, and the aggravating factor of “use of the media” in Law No. 19.733 78. In convicting the petitioner, the domestic court invoked not only the criminal offense of serious insults, but also the aggravating factor of use of the media 62 to disseminate the allegedly defamatory statements, as provided for in Article 29 of Law Nº19.733, the Chilean Press Law. It is therefore important to make some observations on this aggravated modality. 63 79. First of all, it should be noted that Article 418, which establishes the penalty applicable to the offense of serious insults, provides for two different types of penalties. The first – a minimum to medium imprisonment term, plus a fine of 11 to 20 MTU- is applicable to allegedly injurious statements made in writing and with publicity; 64 the second –minor imprisonment, in its minimum degree, and a fine of 6 to 10 MTU- is applicable to allegedly injurious statements not made in writing and without publicity. However, under Article 29 of the Chilean Press Law, when the offense is committed through any means of social communication, the penalty for minor insults shall be 20 to 50 MTU and for serious insults from 20 to 150 MTU. In other words, under Chilean law, when statements that allegedly harm the honor of nuevo derecho penal: ¿decadencia o evolución? Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2012, p. 173 ss.; TEIXEIRA, Adriano. Teoria da aplicação da pena, São Paulo: Marcial Pons, 2015, p. 109. 60 HASSEMER, Op. Cit., p. 265 61 Ibid. p. 242. Our translation. 62 According to Article 2 of the Chilean Press Law, for all legal purposes, "social communication media" shall be understood as those capable of transmitting, disseminating, divulging or propagating, in a stable and regular manner, texts, sounds or images intended for the public, regardless of the support or instrument used. 63 Judgment, §59. 64 According to Article 422 of the Chilean Criminal Code, "in writing and with publicity" shall be understood to mean statements propagated by means of posters or papers posted in public places; for printed papers, not subject to the law of printing, lithographs, engravings or manuscripts communicated to more than five persons, or for allegories, cartoons, emblems or allusions reproduced by means of lithography, engraving, photography or any other process.