19 several tens of half-naked corpses piled together in the North wing of the prison. Many of the dead bodies had bullet marks in head and thorax. He could also see several corpses with gunfire injuries lying on the banks of the gorge called La Línea, which is situated at the back of the prison and flows into the Guaire River. The bodies were not removed immediately, as they still remained in the same place at six in the afternoon. The next of kin of the deceased did not receive either sufficient or timely information. i) Expert opinion of Christopher Birkbeck, expert witness The expert witness described the diverse set of rules in force in Venezuela in 1992, about use of violence, pointing out that it “makes a general reference to the use of force, without specifying the methods that could be used.” With regard to this matter, he emphasized that “many officials were incorporated into the staff of guards without a previous training about their responsibilities and the procedures to be adopted in particular cases.” On evaluating the actions of the governmental officers during the events of November 27 and 28 1992, the expert stated that the inmates showed four categories of behavior to be considered in the restoration of order: i) to stay inside the cellblocks; ii) to go around the prison; iii) to attempt to escape (or succeed in escaping) and iv) to attack the governmental officers. Each of those behaviors demanded specific interventions.” Those who remained inside the cellblocks were not part of the disorder and required no action from the agents.” The inmates that were walking around the prison posed the problem of being in spaces and/or gatherings where they were not allowed to be, so it was required that they return to their respective cellblocks. If the order was disobeyed, it would be necessary to proceed by other means “employing what is typically used to restore public order in the street, which is “the resource of teargas or plastic pellets at most.” “The inmates that tried to escape posed a more serious problem on account of the possibility of evading the trial against them.“ Regarding to those who were still inside the prison, it was according to law to “give them oral order to return to their cellblocks, followed by the use of teargas or plastic pellets, in case they insisted in their attempt to escape.” As for the inmates that were already out of the perimeter of the prison, it was appropriate to give them “oral orders to stop in the first place, and physical capture if they insisted in escaping.” The last available resource, the fire gun, was not appropriate in this case because there is a possibility of an inmate to lose his life and “the mere act of escaping does not amount to a threat to another person’s life, and hence does not justify the use of lethal force.” With regard to the inmates who “attacked the governmental officers[,] they deserved the use of violence against them, considering the level of danger to which such officers were subject, under the principle of proportionality.” The expert concluded that by using fire guns as a response to the situation that took place in the Detention Center of Catia and its surroundings on November 27, 1992, the governmental officers committed serious excess. j) Expert opinion of Ms. Magdalena López-Ibáñez, expert witness The expert witness had the opportunity to examine and interview two of the survivors of the events: Mr. Douglas Lizcano and Mr. Osmar Martínez as well as the next of kin of some victims.