17 hand, he argued that the disciplinary powers of the CORJS “lack[ed] any constitutional grounds whatsoever” and that “in the judicial disciplinary area, on account of legislative default, there is in place an exceptional and provisional system detrimental to the right to the […] natural judge”, for “the judicial disciplinary system in Venezuela, is […] irregular and judges are […] disciplinarily judged by commissions set up for the purpose of passing judgment upon them.” 48. The State indicated that under domestic rules and regulations the CORJS “has competent jurisdiction to take the pertaining disciplinary action in exercise of the powers vested in it.” He contested the argument made by the representative regarding the report by the Commission of the Plenary Chamber stating it is not mandatory, that it was made “just [by] some of the Judges sitting in the Plenary Chamber”, and that later all the members of the aforementioned Plenary Chamber, “upon the request of the former provisional judges of the First Court[,] confirmed […] the competent jurisdiction of the [IGC] and of the [CORJS]” (highlighted phrases not reproduced). 49. The Commission indicated that the purview of the CORJS “had been specified before the fact.” Furthermore, it pointed out that the STJ had determined the point in the Plenary Chamber, recognizing the CORJS competence to investigate the petitioners for disciplinary infringements and to sanction them. 50. Article 8(1) of the Convention guarantees the right to a hearing “by a competent […] tribunal, previously established by law.” This implies that every person “has the right to be heard by regular courts, following procedures previously established,” for which reason the State is not to create tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures to displace the jurisdiction normally belonging to the ordinary courts.64 This tends to prevent persons from being judged by special tribunals set up for the case, or ad hoc. 51. The evidence supporting allegations by the representative is related to a report adopted on July 26, 2000 by a Commission assigned by the STJ appointed to “determine the legal and disciplinary standing of the First Court.” The report pointed out that [t]he disciplinary rules to which the judges are subject pertain to the bodies with disciplinary jurisdiction to be created by law but until such statute be enacted, disciplinary authority over the Judges of the First Court […] shall be exercised by the [STJ], in Plenary Chamber.65 52. However, the Commission and the State are both right when indicating that on September 8, 2004, in a decision on a hierarchical recourse brought by the victims (infra para. 157), the Plenary Chamber of the STJ ratified that “jurisdiction to conduct investigations in a case where a Judge of the First Court is accused of a [disciplinary] infringement” shall be the same one to which all judges are subject, that is to say, “such cases must be submitted to the [CORJS] for consideration.” Thereupon, the Plenary Chamber declined its jurisdiction on the matter.66 As it may be seen, the body that, according to the representative’s allegations, has competent 64 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 129, and Principle 5 of the United Nations Basic Principles. 65 Cf. report of August 10, 2000 issued by STJ Justices Jesús Eduardo Cabrera, José Peña Solis, Levis Ignacio Zerpa and Antonio García García (Evidence file, Book VII, Annex K, pp. 1844 and 1845). 66 Cf. judgment No. 23 of September 8, 2004, delivered by the Plenary Chamber of the STJ, supra note 52, pp. 722 and 723.