9 this case, have not been challenged, and their authenticity and accuracy have not been questioned. 20. With respect to the testimonies and expert opinions rendered by witnesses and expert witnesses, the Court deems them relevant insofar as they comport with their respective subject of testimony established by the Order of the President (supra para. 7), and taking into account all the observations of the parties,17 which will be analyzed in each respective chapter. The Court considers that the statements made by the victims cannot be assessed separately, but rather within the context of the remaining body of evidence in this case, since they have a direct interest in the outcome.18 IV PRELIMINARY OBJECTION (LACK OF EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES) 21. The State affirmed that “the alleged victims ha[d] not pursued and exhausted the remedies available under domestic law and, therefore, they act[ed] in disregard for procedural concerns.” As regards Apitz and Rocha, the State asserted that they had not exhausted the domestic remedies as they had failed to raise a “recourse for review” against the Order of June 3, 2003, passed by the Chamber for Political and Administrative Matters (hereinafter “CPAM”) of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (hereinafter “STJ”). The State further noted that Apitz and Rocha failed to submit a “request for removal to a higher court” against the Order of April 18, 2007 delivered by the CPAM. The State highlighted that both recourses would have served as adequate resources to solve the dispute, and that the alleged victims “were fully acquainted with them, but failed to raise and exhaust them on personal grounds exclusively.” Regarding Ruggeri, the State alleged that “contrary to her former colleagues, she failed to resort to domestic judicial remedies with the aim of enervating the effects of the ruling passed by the Commission for Operating and Restructuring the Judicial System (hereinafter “the CORJS”).” 22. The Commission asserted that the State addressed the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies on October 26, 2004, in its comments on the merits of the case, i.e., beyond the scheduled term. The Commission quoted its admissibility report when referring to the fact that the State “forfeited any objection to the failure to exhaust domestic remedies, since it did not raise such an objection at the earliest opportunity in the process, namely in its response to the petition that gave rise to the proceedings.” It further noted that “given that the State has not submitted new evidence allowing the Court to deliver a new order,” it requests the Court “to dismiss the preliminary objection […] insofar [… its] purpose is to have this [C]ourt review an issue that has been finally resolved” by the Commission. 23. The representative sustained, inter alia, that “the defendant State failed to timely assert before the Commission an alleged lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies, and failed to object to the admissibility petition filed before it,” hence, its acts should be construed as a tacit forfeiture of its right to object to the failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 17 On January 30, 2008, the State submitted comments on the evidence furnished by the other parties (File on the Merits, Book III, pp. 1227 to 1236). 18 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 43; Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166. para. 40, and Case of Kimel, supra note 8, para. 35.