The State asked the Court to “establish the amounts it considers appropriate” with regard to the requests for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and reimbursement of costs and expenses, but it maintained that some of the claims for damages lacked a causal nexus or supporting evidence. 26. Taking into consideration that several issues remain in dispute with regard to some of the facts that constitute alleged violations of Articles 5, 13, 22, 19, 8(1), 25, 4 and 11 of the Convention, as well as the determination of appropriate measures of reparation, the Court finds it necessary to deliver a judgment in which it determines the facts that occurred, specifies the scope of the violations recognized, and rules on the issues still in dispute. In addition, the Court emphasizes that such a judgment contributes to making redress to the victims, to avoiding the repetition of similar events and, in sum, to achieving the purposes of the inter-American human rights jurisdiction.18 IV PRELIMINARY OBJECTION The Court’s alleged lack of competence to examine facts or claims included in the Merits Report “that do not comply with the requirements of the Convention or the Rules of Procedure” A) Arguments of the State and observations of the representative and the Inter-American Commission 27. In the answering brief, the State argued as a preliminary objection “the lack of competence of the […] Court to examine and admit facts or claims included within the factual framework of the Merits Report presented by the Commission when submitting the case that do not comply with the requirements established in the Convention.” Colombia stated that it “respects the independence, autonomy, and broad powers of the […] Commission to assess the evidence,” but that, in this case, the said organ declared that some of the facts were proved “owing to an incorrect assessment of documents provided as evidence of their existence and circumstances.” In this regard, the State set out the reasons why it considered that the Commission “incorrectly assessed the evidence” regarding two aspects of the factual determinations of the Merits Report: (a) the determination that the presumed threats, harassment, and attempted kidnapping suffered by Mr. Vélez Restrepo involved State agents and had a causal nexus with what happened on August 29, 1996, and the subsequent actions aimed to obtain justice, and (b) the description of the injuries presumably suffered by Mr. Vélez Restrepo on August 29, 1996. The State asked the Court to effect “a control of legality” in order to ensure that the factual framework of the Merits Report does not constitute a factor of procedural inequality for the State and, consequently, to “declare itself incompetent to examine those facts incorrectly determined by the Commission.” Colombia emphasized the importance of this issue, taking into account that this is “the factual framework on which the brief with pleadings, motions and evidence is based […] in order to determine the presumed violations and, thus, the claims for compensation.” 28. The representative observed that “[t]he proven facts in a case and the violations derived from them are matters that relate to the proceedings on merits in the case, and are not a preliminary objection.” 18 Cf. Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, para. 26, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and reparations, para. 28. 12