159. The Court observes that, in its answering brief, the State affirmed that there was no evidence that Mr. Vélez and Mrs. Román had personally filed complaints regarding the threats before the Prosecutor’s Office, the National Police, or the DAS. Nevertheless, at the same time, it accepted that “[i]t is true that the petitioners denounced the facts relating to the threats[s]” and indicated that, “regarding the presumed threats,” inter alia, a criminal investigation was opened in the ordinary jurisdiction in 1996. For the Court, the relevant point is that, in October 1996, an investigation was opened before the 243 rd Bogota Sectional Prosecutor’s Office for the offense of threats. The Court infers that State authorities were informed of the facts, either by organizations or other persons, or by Mr. Vélez and his wife (supra paras. 86, 88, 90, 91, 92 and 95). 160. The Court notes that, both to contest that the threats had occurred, and also its responsibility for them, in addition to affirming that the evidence was insufficient (supra para. 154), Colombia maintained that “the disciplinary investigations opened against the State agents for the supposed threats were closed for lack of merit.” In this regard, this Court has found it pertinent to recall that, in order to establish that there has been a violation of the rights recognized in the Convention, it is not necessary to prove the State’s responsibility beyond all reasonable doubt or to identify, individually, the agents to which the violations are attributed.172 In addition, the Court reiterates that it is the State’s responsibility to investigate the facts diligently by judicial proceedings,173 which Colombia acknowledged that it had not done (supra para. 14). Moreover, the Court underscores that, in the criminal jurisdiction, the investigations concluded for reasons that differed greatly from “lack of merit.” The criminal investigation opened in 1996 ended on the basis that the “facts had already been denounced in the civil and criminal jurisdiction before the military criminal justice system” (supra para. 118). Nevertheless, in response to a request for useful evidence, the State informed the Court that “investigations were not conducted in the military jurisdiction” for the threats.174 Furthermore, the criminal investigation initiated in 2007 concluded in 2010 on the basis that the offense had prescribed (supra para. 119). C.1.b) Regarding the evidence to consider proved the attempted arbitrary deprivation of liberty 161. Regarding the probative elements that this Court assessed to find that the attempted arbitrary deprivation of liberty of which Mr. Vélez Restrepo was a victim on October 6, 1996, had been proved (supra para. 94), the Court underlines that, in addition to having assessed the statements made by Mr. Vélez Restrepo and his wife by affidavit in 2005 and before this Court, other probative elements were provided in this regard. The Court emphasizes that the day before that incident, Mr. Vélez Restrepo received a serious written threat consisting in an obituary notice or condolence card regarding his own death, of which he provided a copy (supra para. 93). In his statement before this Court, Mr. Vélez Restrepo referred to the danger that a threat as serious as this signified in Colombia. Even expert witness Tulande indicated, citing a “well-known [Colombian] journalist,” that, in Colombia, “threats are carried out” (supra para. 84). In addition, the Court takes into account the reaction and intervention of national and international authorities when Mr. Vélez Restrepo reported that 172 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 71, and Case of González Medina and family members v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 133. 173 Cf. Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166, para. 128, and Case of Contreras et al. v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 135. 174 Cf. note DIDH/GOI No. 48794/1892 of July 18, 2012, of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (file of useful evidence presented by the State, tome I, folio 2). 49