the family life of the Vélez Román,” and referred to these consequences. The Commission indicated that “the actions of a State that have the effect, even indirectly, of separating an individual from his or her family and children may constitute violations of the rights of the family and the rights of the child.” 217. The representative stated that he “agree[d] fully with the Inter-American Commission” as regards the alleged violations of Articles 17(1), 22(1), and 19 of the Convention. In addition, he referred in detail to the alleged consequences of the facts of this case on the members of the Vélez Román family. He emphasized that “the impact of what happened to Richard Vélez at Caquetá had very serious consequences on the family life and mental integrity of the children, Mateo and Juliana Vélez Román.” 218. The State affirmed that there was no violation of Article 22 of the Convention because it considered that “it has not been duly proved […] that the alleged threats were made by State agents,” and “it is not possible to establish a causal nexus between the presumed threats and attempted kidnapping that allegedly occurred, and the need for Mr. Vélez to leave the country on October 9, 1997.” It asserted that, “prior to the supposed attempted kidnapping on October 6, 1997, Mr. Vélez had never requested any protection or safety assessment from the State.” The State argued that “on the day on which the attempted kidnapping presumably occurred, the Protection Program of the Ministry of the Interior offered Mr. Vélez and his family the possibility of relocating to any part of the country in order to lessen the risk he had denounced, guaranteeing them financial assistance for three months.” In addition, it indicated that, “[d]espite this, Mr. Vélez indicated that he wished to leave the country because he considered he would not feel safe in any part of [its] territory. The State asked, subsidiarily, that, if the Court found that there had been a violation to Article 22 of the Convention, “it declare that the presumed violations to the rights of the family and the rights of the children are subsumed in the violations to the right to freedom of movement and residence.” Regarding the alleged violation of Article 19 of the Convention, Colombia indicated that, in the instant case, there was no specific context of social risk as regards the children. B) Considerations of the Court 219. In this chapter, the Court will rule on the State’s alleged responsibility for the violations of freedom of movement and residence,206 the rights of the family,207 and the rights of the child.208 B.1) Freedom of movement and residence 220. The Court has established that freedom of movement and residence, protected in Article 22(1) of the American Convention, is an essential condition for the free development of an individual,209 and includes, inter alia, the right of those who are legally in a State to 206 Article 22(1) of the American Convention establishes that: “[e]very person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the right to move about in it, and to reside in it subject to the provisions of the law.” 207 Article 17(1) of the American Convention establishes that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.” 208 Article 19 of the American Convention establishes that “[e]very minor child has the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the State.” 209 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 115, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 197. 64