move within it freely, as well as to choose their place of residence. 210 This right may be violated formally or by de facto restrictions, when the State has not established the conditions or provided the means that allow it to be exercised. 211 The said de facto violations may occur when an individual is the victim of threats or harassment and the State fails to provide the necessary guarantees to ensure they may move and reside freely within the territory in question.212 In addition, the Court has indicated that the lack of an effective investigation of violent acts can encourage or perpetuate exile or forced displacement. 213 221. The Court considers that, in the instant case, de facto restrictions existed to the freedom of movement and residence of Mr. Vélez Restrepo, Mrs. Román Amariles, and their children Mateo and Juliana, because the State’s omission to guarantee the right to personal integrity of Mr. Vélez Restrepo and his family, by the investigation together with opportune measures of protection or prevention (supra paras. 186 to 205), gave rise to great insecurity and their well-founded fear that their life and personal integrity were at risk of being violated if they remained in Colombia, which led to their exile.214 222. In the preceding chapter, the Court determined the State’s responsibility, inter alia, for the omission to adopt opportune measures of protection before the threats and harassment they suffered as of September 1996 that culminated in a grave death threat followed by an attempted kidnapping of Mr. Vélez Restrepo in August 1997 in Bogotá. In addition, the State acknowledged its responsibility for the absence of serious investigations into these facts (supra para. 14). 223. The Court appreciated the fact that, after the said attempted deprivation of liberty of Mr. Vélez Restrepo, the State offered protection measures, but considered that they were not opportune and that a risk continued to exist and that Mr. Vélez Restrepo had a wellfounded fear that he would not be protected in any part of the country. Mr. Vélez Restrepo was able to leave Colombia on October 9, 1997, three days after the attempted deprivation of his freedom, and his wife and children had to displace internally from Bogotá to Medellín, while they waited almost a year for the approval of the asylum request by the United States authorities, after which they also left the country. 224. Therefore, the Court concludes that the State is responsible for the violation of freedom of movement and residence, protected by Article 22(1) of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Luis Gonzalo Vélez Restrepo, Aracelly Román Amariles, Mateo Vélez Román and Juliana Vélez Román. B.2) Protection of the family and rights of the child 210 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 115, and Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 138. 211 Cf. Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, paras. 119 and 120, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 197. 212 Cf. Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 139, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 197. 213 Cf. Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, paras. 119 and 120, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 201. 214 Cf. Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 201, and Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti. Merits and reparations, para. 94 and 95. 65