constitutes the main reason for the impunity that exists in relation to the attack that took place on August 29, 1996.” In addition, the Commission rejected the State’s arguments on the competent jurisdiction at the time of the facts, and affirmed that the Court’s jurisdiction is constant in relation to the standards in force, according to which “under no circumstance may the military jurisdiction operate in situations that violate the human rights of civilians.” The Commission added that the Court has applied these standards in cases in which the facts occurred even before the facts of the instant case, and that this “does not constitute a retroactive application of the obligations of international law, […] but rather the interpretation of obligations that have existed from the moment that Colombia ratified the American Convention.” In addition, it referred to some of its reports that, it affirmed, at the time of the facts of this case had already established the said standards. The Commission also argued that the prohibition that the military criminal jurisdiction examine human rights violations “was not based on the severity of the human rights violations, but rather on their nature.” 237. The State argued that the criterion of the exceptional nature of the military jurisdiction, established by the current inter-American case law, did not exist at the time of the facts and that, in addition, it had been developed in cases in which grave human rights violations had been committed. It indicated that the Court’s case law had undergone “important changes between 1996 and 2006” and that, according to the sources available at the time of the facts of this case, the military criminal jurisdiction had the status of a natural judge to examine “the violation of the personal integrity of Mr. Vélez.” The State affirmed that, prior to the 2009 judgment in Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, the applicable standard “to determine whether a conduct should be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction, was the extreme gravity of the human rights violations” and that “other human rights violations examined by military courts would not be per se violations of the American Convention.” Likewise, it referred to the Court’s decision in the 1997 judgment in Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua, in which it did not declare a violation of the principle of the natural judge. It also referred to reports of the Inter-American Commission, and to a General Comment of the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and to the case law of the Colombian Constitutional Court. The State argued that “it is not possible to declare [its] international responsibility […], because that would be against the principle of the nonretroactive nature of obligations in international law” and asked the Court to declare that it had “not violated the principle of the natural judge.” Considerations of the Court 238. According to the proven facts (supra paras. 106 and 107), the attack on Mr. Vélez Restrepo by soldiers on August 29, 1996, was the object of a preliminary investigation in the military criminal jurisdiction, and the final ruling decided “to abstain from opening a formal criminal investigation.” In this preliminary inquiry into the offense of personal injuries, other supposed offenses to the detriment of individuals who were injured in relation to the incidents that took place on the said date during the protest demonstration in Caquetá were also investigated (supra para. 106). Consequently, the Court finds it relevant to recall that the guarantee of Article 8(1) of the Convention in relation to the intervention of the military justice system “does not refer only to the act of prosecution by a court but, above all, to the investigation itself, since it constitutes the start and the necessary presumption for the subsequent intervention of an incompetent court.”228 228 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010. Series C No. 215, para. 177, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, para. 200. Similarly, cf. Case of Garibaldi v. Brazil. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 23, 2009. Series C No. 203, para. 120. 69