241. In this regard, it should be mentioned that, even though this Court’s consistent case law is the interpretive authority of the obligations established in the American Convention, the obligation not to investigate and prosecute human rights violations under the military criminal jurisdiction is a guarantee of due process derived from the obligations contained in Article 8(1) of the American Convention and does not depend solely on what this Court has reaffirmed in its case law. The guarantee that violations of human rights such as life and personal integrity are investigated by a competent court is embodied in the American Convention and is not the result of its application and interpretation by this Court in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction; thus it must be respected by the States Parties from the moment they ratify the said treaty. 242. Regarding Colombia’s reference to the judgment in the case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua,232 in which it did not declare a violation of the guarantee of a natural judge, the Court notes that, at the time the State could have investigated the attack perpetrated by soldiers against Mr. Vélez Restrepo, it also delivered the judgment in the case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, in which it stated that the military criminal jurisdiction only applies to “soldiers, for the perpetration of crimes or misdemeanors that, owing to their nature, harm military juridical rights.”233 This has been the constant criterion of this Court’s case law (supra para. 240). The Court notes that Colombia could have taken this into consideration to investigate the attack on Mr. Vélez Restrepo in the competent ordinary criminal jurisdiction, since there is no evidence that, in 2000, the offense of injuries had prescribed. 243. The Court stresses that it has been able to construct the restrictive jurisprudential criterion, which it is currently developing fully, through the analysis of the different contentious cases that have been submitted to its consideration. The Court also emphasizes that, in several cases the facts of which took place prior to 1996,234 the year in which the attack against Mr. Vélez Restrepo was committed, this Court upheld the said restrictive and exceptional scope of the military criminal jurisdiction (supra para. 240). This confirms the foregoing, in the sense that the obligation not to prosecute human rights violations under the military jurisdiction is a guarantee of due process derived from the obligations included in Article 8(1) of the American Convention. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that, even though the standard in question has been developed mainly through cases on grave human rights violations, this is only because the facts submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction were of this nature, and not because the competence to hear the case must be assigned to the ordinary jurisdiction only and exclusively in such cases. 244. Therefore, the Court reiterates that the criteria to investigate and prosecute human rights violations before the ordinary jurisdiction reside not on the gravity of the violations, but rather on their very nature and on that of the protected juridical right. The Court repeats that, regardless of the year in which the acts that violated human rights occurred, the guarantee of a natural judge must be analyzed according to the object and purpose of the American Convention, which is the effective protection of the individual.235 232 Cf. Case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 30. 233 The factual situation of the case of Durand and Ugarte refers to the suppression of a 1986 prison uprising, in which soldiers “used disproportionate force that was far in excess of the limits of their function, which resulted in the death of a large number of prisoners.” Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Merits, para. 118. 234 Cf. Case of the La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 200, the facts of which occurred as of 1989; Case of Escué Zapata v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, the facts of which occurred as of 1988, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs, the facts of which occurred as of 1993. 235 Cf. Case of the 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 173, and Case of the La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 200. 71