instant case, the necessary presumptions do not exist to apply any of the exceptions to implementation of the statute of limitations argued by the Commission. 284. Based on the above, and taking into consideration its consistent case law, the Court finds that it is not possible to determine that the statute of limitations cannot be applied in the case of the acts of violence on August 29, 1996 (supra paras. 80 to 82), and the threats and harassments of 1996 and 1997 (supra paras. 85 to 93). However, based on the impunity that prevails in the instant case, the Court finds it necessary to order the State to advise whether, under Colombian law, it is possible to adopt other measures or actions that allow the responsibilities in this case for the said acts to be determined and, if so, to take these measures or actions. 285. With regard to the investigation into the attempted deprivation of liberty of Mr. Vélez Restrepo on October 6, 1997 (supra para. 94), the Court takes into account that, in its answering brief, the State indicated its intention to “[advance] the investigation that is still ongoing into the presumed attempted kidnapping.”262 The Court considers that the State must investigate this incident diligently and within a reasonable time, in order to clarify it and punish those responsible. C) Other measures requested C.1) Written apology and its dissemination in the media 286. The representative asked that the State be ordered to make a public acknowledgment of responsibility and a public apology to Mr. Vélez Restrepo, his wife Aracelly Román Amariles, and their children Mateo and Juliana Vélez Román, by measures such as a “formal written statement issued by high-ranking State authorities” and its publication in several newspapers in Colombia and the United States, as well as the “preparation and recording of a video clip for television” to be broadcast “on institutional and commercial channels in Colombia […] and on the Day of the Journalist.” In this regard, the Court recalls that, in its judgments, when it orders a public act of acknowledgment of responsibility it requires that there be a public ceremony in the presence of high-ranking State officials and the victims in the case, in which reference is made to the human rights violations that have been declared. The Court appreciates the fact that, in the instant case, Colombia has made a partial acknowledgment of responsibility (supra paras. 13 and 14) and that, at the public hearing, it apologized to the Vélez Román family (supra para. 17). This is complemented by the fact that, in this Judgment, the Court has declared violations to human rights additional to the ones acknowledged by the State. The recording of the said public hearing is available on the Court’s web page. Consequently, the Court does not consider it appropriate to order the measures requested by the representative and finds that September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 116; Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C No. 101, para. 276; Case of Molina Theissen v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of July 3, 2004. Series C No. 108, para. 84; Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Series C No. 110, para. 150; Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 259; Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of November 19, 2004. Series C No. 116, para. 99; Case of Carpio Nicolle et al. v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2004. Series C No. 117, para. 130; Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series Case of Gelman v. Uruguay. Merits and reparations. Judgment of February 24, 2011 Series C No. 221, para. 225, and Case of Vera Vera et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, para. 117. 262 On April 26, 2012, by a writ of prohibition, the prosecutor for the investigation abstained from opening preliminary proceedings (file of useful evidence presented by the State, tome II, folios 518 to 520). However, in its final arguments the State did not submit any consideration in this regard. 81