301. For its part, the State asked that the Court, taking into account its partial
acknowledgment of responsibility, “to establish the amounts it considers appropriate.”
However, it observed that “the sums requested […] are excessive in comparison with those
ordered by [the] Court in cases of similar or even greater harm.”
302. Considering the circumstances of the case sub judice, the suffering that the violations
committed caused the victims, as well as the change in their living conditions and the other
consequences of a non-pecuniary nature they suffered, the Court finds it appropriate to
establish an amount, in equity, as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Court
takes into account the suffering and harm caused to the victims owing to the human rights
violations declared in the instant case, the impunity in which these violations remain, and
the different consequences that exile has had on the members of the Vélez Román family,
such as the separation from their relatives in Colombia, the financial and employment
situation they have faced in the United States of America, and the harm to Mr. Vélez
Restrepo’s professional activities as a journalist. The Court finds it appropriate to establish,
in equity, the sum of US$60,000 (sixty thousand United States dollars) in favor of Luis
Gonzalo Vélez Restrepo, as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Also, for the same
concept, the Court establishes, in equity, compensation of US$40,000 (forty thousand
United States dollars) for Aracelly Román Amariles, as well as compensation of US$30,000
(thirty thousand United States dollars) for Mateo Vélez Román, and US$20,000 (twenty
thousand United States dollars) for Juliana Vélez Román. These amounts must be paid
within one year of notification of the Judgment.
E) Costs and expenses
303. As the Court has indicated previously, costs and expenses are included in the
concept of reparation established in Article 63(1) of the American Convention.276
304. In the pleadings and motions brief, the representative asked the Court to order the
State to reimburse the expenses he had incurred “by processing the case before the Court,”
corresponding to US$1,602.27, which covers “the cost of travelling as a team from
Washington to New York […] in February 2011 to work with members of the Vélez Restrepo
family for several days.” In his final written arguments, he asked that, for the concept of
costs and expenses, the Court order, “in equity, the payment of US$10,000 in recognition of
temporary family separation from October 1997 to September 1998; (iii) the exile and separation from her family
in Colombia; (iv) the sacrifice and concern for the safety and well-being of her family; (v) the impunity in which the
facts remain, and (vi) the harm to her life project since “the violations suffered and their consequences have put an
end to her personal and professional projects.”
274
Regarding Mateo Vélez Román, the representative argued that the non-pecuniary damage suffered results
from: (i) his status as a “direct and indirect victim of the threats, surveillance and harassment in Colombia”; (ii)
the difficult family experience in Bogotá and the separation from his father in October 1997; (iii) the separation
from his mother and his sister in Medellín; (iv) the exile and the situation he has had to undergo in the United
States as an immigrant, where he has even had “to work while he was studying in order to provide financial
support to his family”; (v) the “fight to define his identity because he feels that he has lost much of his Colombian
roots and culture” and the “loss of his family ties with his grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins,” and (vi) the
“stress and physical signs of frailty” owing to “the psychological impact of all he has experienced.”
275
Regarding Juliana Vélez Román, the representative argued that the non-pecuniary damage suffered
relates to: (i) the “abnormal turn” to her life “because of the grave violations suffered by her family in Colombia”;
(ii) the separation from her father “at a very early age”; (iii) the exile in a country other than her own, with
different socio-economic conditions and the separation from her family in Colombia, and (iv) having to share “the
suffering of her parents and brother.”
276
Cf. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina. Reparations and costs, para. 79, and Case of Fontevecchia
and D’Amico v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 124.
86