51. The Inter-American Commission argued that, although Paraguayan legislation recognizes and expressly guarantees the right to property of the indigenous peoples, and even though the members of the Community in the instant case started the procedure for recovering their traditional lands in 1990, “a definitive solution has [still] not been reached.” According to the Commission, the area claimed by the victims has been part of their traditional habitat since time immemorial, and therefore they have the right to recover these lands, or to obtain others of the same size and quality in order to guarantee their right to preserve and develop their cultural identity. 52. The representatives also insisted that, to date, the State has not responded to the Community’s petition, even though it complies with each and every one of the requirements of Paraguayan law. They argued that the State has recognized the violation of the Community’s right to property, but the measures it has adopted have been inadequate to restore the land claimed. 53. The State indicated that it had guaranteed the Community access to all the available legal means to exercise its right to communal property, but it had “not been able to satisfy [that right] fully to date [owing to] factual circumstances that it has not been possible to resolved at the domestic level.” The State underlined that domestic law protects the right to private property and that “the owners of the land that the Community claims is their ancestral property possess duly registered property titles”; consequently, the State “is faced with the two protected human rights.” It added that the “Community claims [the territory] without owning or possessing the property it claims.” According to the State, “the traditional territory [of the members of the Community] covers an area greater than that being claimed and is not limited to the Salazar Ranch,” which is a “fully-functioning ranch,” so that an alternative solution must be sought. Lastly, Paraguay insisted that it was “taking pertinent measures to reestablish the communal property of the Xákmok Kásek,” which, it argued, is reflected in the State’s intention to transfer 1,500 hectares to the Community. 54. In this chapter, the Court will examine whether the State has guaranteed and given effect to the right to property of the members of the Community in relation to their traditional lands. To this end, the Court will determine the facts that have been proved and will make the pertinent legal findings. 55. The Court will analyze the facts related to the right to property of the members of the Community and their claim to their traditional lands that took place after March 11, 1993, the date on which the State accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. However, as it has in previous cases,39 it will also indicate facts that took place previously, but merely to consider them as background to the case, without drawing any legal conclusions from them. 1. Facts 1.1. Regarding the indigenous communities in Paraguay 56. Before the Chaco was colonized, the indigenous peoples lived in small, flexible communities.40 The economy of the members of the indigenous peoples of the Chaco 39 Cf. Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 82; Case of the “Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala, supra note 12, para. 178, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, supra note 8, para. 46. 40 Cf. Kidd, Stephen: “Los Indígenas Enxet: condiciones laborales,” 1994 (file of attachments provided by the State at the public hearing, tome IX, folio 3678, and file of attachments to the pleadings and motions brief, folios 2740 to 2759), and Testimony of Rodrigo Villagra Carron, supra note 17. 14