34 88. As this Tribunal has held, States must restrict to the maximum extent the use of Armed Forces to control domestic crime or internal violence, since they are trained to defeat a legitimate objective and not to protect and control civilians, a training that is typical of police forces.121 The strict fulfillment of the duty to prevent and protect the endangered rights must be assumed by the domestic authorities in observance of a clear demarcation between military and police duties.122 89. The Court considers that the possibility of granting the Armed Forces functions intended to restrict the personal liberty of civilians, in addition to meeting the requirements of strict proportionality in the restriction of a right, must respond, in turn, to strict exceptional criteria and due diligence in the protection of treaty guarantees, taking into account, as indicated (supra paras. 86 and 87) that the regime of the armed forces, from which its members can distance themselves only through great effort, is not compatible with the functions of civilian authorities. 3. Lack of prompt remittance to a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power 90. The Commission indicated that "once detained, the [alleged] victims had to be promptly brought […] before the Public Prosecutor’s Office in order for this authority to deliver them to the judge,” which “did not happen until at least four days after their arrest,” and “from the records and arguments of the State it is not possible to infer reasons to justify [this delay].” On the other hand, the Commission expressed in a public hearing that “it did not include [in its report on the merits and its application] a factual conclusion on the occurrence of the crime.” 91. For the representatives, the alleged victims were “at the military post improvised on Pizotla river for 48 hours […] and later they were transferred to the Battalion where [they were held] for two additional days, until Friday May 7, [whe]n they were brought before a judge.” According to the representatives, “[t]his delay is obviously unwarranted, since as of the time of the arrest of the [alleged] victims, there was a helicopter available for their transfer.” In addition, the representatives noted that "the military never brought the [alleged] victims before the Public Prosecutor's Office nor they were in Arcelia, but at some point, several local officials appeared at the Battalion to draw up a report on the weapons and possibly issue other documents which would then be presented in the criminal proceedings[,] such as the sodium rhodizonate test.” Therefore, “taking into account that [the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Coyuca de Catalán] did not receive the [alleged] victims until Thursday 6, according to the official documents, it [would be possible] to conclude that they were held at the Battalion, at least, until that day.” The representatives further alleged that the “intervention of the Public Prosecutor’s Office […] does not substitute for or equal the judicial authority.” Similarly, the representatives indicated that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel were unlawfully detained without an arrest warrant and without them committing any crime. Furthermore, that the arrest was “made as a retaliation against [them] for defending the forests,” “with excessive use of force” and “[t]o torture and force them to sign false confessions,” by militaries without the authorization of civil authorities to be in the area. Vélez et al v. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 51; Case of Perozo et al V. Venezuela, supra note 24, para. 166. 121 Cf. Case of Montero Aranguren et al (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela, supra note 120, para. 78; and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al v. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 51. 122 Cf. Case of Zambrano Vélez et al v. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 51.