63 A. Criminal proceedings conducted against Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel 1. Right to defense 152. The representatives alleged that the court-appointed defense counsels i) “d[id] not present evidence in favor of the [detainees] or [to] contradict the evidence […] presented against them; ii) did not inform them about the right not to make a statement; iii) did not object to the lack of diligence of the military officers; iv) did not challenge the interrogations conducted […] after the detention without the presence of a lawyer; v) did not challenge the expert opinions rendered by non-specialized persons [regarding the matter]; vi) did not require the necessary measures in order to certify the injuries [against the alleged victims]; vi) (sic) did not have a previous interview with them and vii) did not denounce the alleged torture committed against Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel. Likewise, they indicated that the court order declaring the lawfulness of the victims’ arrest was not objected, despite the fact that the term of 48 hours to bring them before the judicial authority had expired. 153. The Commission did not present arguments about this topic. The State mentioned that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel “had the corresponding public legal counseling and assistance.” It mentioned that the victims always maintained contact with the lawyers in order to prepare their defense. 154. The Court has previously held that the right to defense must be necessarily exercised as from the moment a person is accused of being the perpetrator or participant of an illegal act and ends when the jurisdiction thereby ceases,234 including, where applicable, the enforcement phase. To prevent a person from exercising his right to defense from the moment the investigation begins and the authority in charge orders or executes actions entailing an infringement of rights is to magnify the investigative powers of the State to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the person under investigation. The right to defense binds the State to treat the person, at all times, as a true party to the proceeding, in the broadest sense of this concept and not simply as an object thereof.235 155. Specially, the Court emphasizes that the defense provided by the State must be effective, for which the State must adopt all the adequate measures.236 If the right to defense arises as of the moment in which an investigation into an individual is ordered, the accused must have access to a legal representation from that moment onwards, especially during the procedure in which his statement is rendered. To prevent the accused from being advised by a counsel means to strictly limit the right to defense, which leads to a procedural unbalance and leaves the individual unprotected before the punishing authority.237 Notwithstanding, the appointment of a defense counsel by the court with the sole purpose of complying with a procedural formality would mean not to have legal representation, for which it is imperative that said defense counsel acts diligently in order to protect the procedural guarantees of the accused and thereby prevent his rights from being violated. 234 Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra note 100, para. 29. See mutatis mutandis Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997, Series Nº. 35, para. 71; Case of Heliodoro Portugal v Panamá. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C N. 186, para. 148; and Case of Bayarri v. Argentina, supra note 123, para. 105. 235 Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra note 100, para. 29. 236 Cf. ECHR, Case of Artico v. Italy, Judgment of 13 May 1980, App. N°. 6694/74, paras. 31-37. 237 Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra note 100, para. 62.