72 179. Moreover, the State indicated that “even when the arrest of [Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel] took place during the commission of a crime in flagrante and the detainees themselves confessed to have committed certain illicit acts,” the courts channeled their efforts “to prove the existence of a criminal codification and consequently, their criminal responsibility.” Likewise, the State “emphasize[d] that at no time, the defense was hindered […] and each one of the arguments and evidence furnished by the defense was subjected to legal assessment.” In addition, “the burden of proof laid on the [P]ublic [P]rosecutor’s Office, office that had to prove the elements of the crime based on different items of evidence which, once furnished and correlated with each other, proved the criminal responsibility of Messrs. Montiel and Cabrera. 180. In the instant case, the lower court judgment established that “[t]he court weighted what was beneficial and prejudicial to them, the fact that their health was jeopardized, the tranquility, peace and public security, […] and it [was] determin[ed] that the level of guilt" of Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel “[was] minimal and [that] minimum penalties [should be] imposed on them, specially because it was not conclusively verified that […] they belong[ed] to an armed group.”275 181. Moreover, the judgment of August 21, 20002 indicated that the principle of innocence “[was] revalidated upon having verified, taking into account all the evidence, [the] criminal responsibility for the perpetration of the crime [which] was […] consider[ed] proven, based on the evidence that proved to be suitable and sufficient to that end.”276 At any case, the final judgment prior to said ruling emphasized that “[the] Federal Court deemed the evidence the Public Prosecutor’s Office gathered at the preliminary inquiry stage regarding the crimes of possession of firearm without a permit and crime against health in the form of cultivation of marijuana to be ineffective.”277 182. This Court has pointed out that the principle of presumption of innocence is a tenet of a fair trial [judicial guarantees].278 The presumption of innocence implies that the defendant does not have to prove that he has not committed the offense of which he is accused, because the onus probandi lays on the prosecutor.279 Hence, irrefutable demonstration of the guilt is an essential requirement for the criminal penalty, for that the burden of proof lays on the prosecutor and not the accused.280 275 Cf. Judgment issued on August 28, 2000 by the Fifth District Court, supra note 75, folio 11276. 276 Cf. Judgment of August 21, 2002 issued by the First Unitary Tribunal, supra note 148, folio 15301. 277 Cf. Judgment of August 14, 2002 issued by the Second Collegiate Tribunal, supra note 84, folios 14641 to 14642. 278 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, supra note 234, para. 77; Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, supra note 102, para. 160; and Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra note 99, para. 145. 279 Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C N. 111, para. 154. 280 Likewise, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has indicated that “the presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proof, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle. It is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused.”.” United Nations. Human Rights Committee. General Comment N° 32, supra note 258, para. 30.