73 183. Likewise, the Tribunal has held, as stated in Article 8(2) of the Convention, that the principle of presumption of innocence demands that a person cannot be convicted unless there is full proof of his criminal liability. If the evidence presented is incomplete or insufficient, he must be acquitted, not convicted.281 Hence, the lack of full proof of the criminal responsibility in a condemnatory judgment constitutes a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence,282 which is an essential element for the effective exercise of the right to defense and accompanies the defendant throughout the proceedings until the judgment determining his guilt is final.283 184. According to that stablished by the European Court, the principle of presumption of innocence implies that the judges should not start a proceeding with a preconceived idea that the accused has committed the crime charged; the burden of proof is on the prosecutor, and any doubt should benefit the accused. The presumption of innocence will be violated if, without the accused having previously been proven guilty, a judicial decision concerning him reflects an opinion that he is guilty.284 185. In the instant case, the Court notes that, in the first stage of the proceeding against Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel, evidence challenged by the defense for being irregular and tainted was admitted. These questionings were analyzed by the different instances that heard the case and, in some cases, the argument of the defense was recognized. In fact, according to the terms of the final judgment of August 14, 2002, “[the] Federal Court deemed the evidence the Public Prosecutor’s Office gathered at the preliminary inquiry stage regarding the crimes of possession of firearm without a permit and crime against health in the form of cultivation of marijuana to be ineffective” (supra para. 73), with which part of the evidence challenged by the defense was not assessed when determining the conviction of the victims. 186. The Court notes that there is no sufficient evidence to consider that the victims had been treated as guilty. In fact, despite they were associated with a situation of flagrante delicto, in general terms, the domestic judicial instances treated them as if they were persons whose criminal responsibility was still subjected to a clear and sufficient determination. Therefore, this Court deems that it has not been proven that the State violated article 8(2) of the Convention, to the detriment of the victims, in relation to the proceeding conducted against them. B. Criminal proceedings to investigate the alleged torture committed against Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel 187. The Commission stated that the military jurisdiction “was not the competent authority to investigate the facts, inasmuch as military justice should only be used in cases in which military criminal legal interests are endangered […].” Hence, it considered that the complaint of torture “extends beyond any defense and security related function [of the State],” therefore “[it] cannot be considered [as a] servicerelated crime and [that] the investigation into these facts should have been conducted [in] the regular courts.” The representatives agreed with the 281 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, supra note 272, para. 120; Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra note 279, para. 153. 282 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, supra note 272, para. 121. 283 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra note 279, para. 154. 284 ECHR, Case of Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain, Judgment of 6 December 1988, App. Nos. 10588/83, 10589/83, 10590/83, paras. 77 and 91.