“Right of the girls M., V. and R. to be heard and have their opinions taken into consideration” it explained in detail the provisions concerning a child’s right to be heard, in order to ensure that the child’s intervention is in line with these conditions and does not harm his or her genuine interest. Therefore, the Court considers that there is no doubt that the State was ordered to obtain girl V’s free opinion regarding whether she wishes to be considered as an injured party. 21. In this regard, the Court notes that there is a difference between the mode of compliance with the compensation for non-pecuniary damage addressed in paragraphs 299 and 313, and the rest of the reparations ordered (supra para. 19). In this respect, the Court specifies by way of interpretation that the compensation granted must be awarded under the terms established in paragraph 313 of the Judgment, and that therefore the State shall deposit the funds in the aforementioned financial institution, without the requirement to obtain the free opinion of the girl V., bearing in mind that those funds may be withdrawn by the beneficiaries when they come of age. As to the other measures of reparation ordered in favor of the girl V., these shall require her free opinion. 22. Furthermore, the Court considers that the various disputes that could arise as a result of obtaining the free opinion of the girl V. should be settled by the Court in the context of the process of monitoring compliance with Judgment. B. Implementation of rehabilitation, ordered as reparations by the Court in favor of M., V. and R 23. The representatives argued that, because “the girls M., V. and R live under the guardianship and personal care of their father”, “at the moment, none of them is in a position of independence and freedom to express her agreement to the psychological therapy in a completely free manner, and for this reason the measure of reparation ordered runs the risk of being inapplicable.” Consequently, they asked the Court to “expressly indicate the material circumstances in which it is possible to apply the six-month period, that is, from the time they reach 18 yeas of age and complete their schooling.” 24. The State argued that the request by the representatives “[would] imply an open contradiction of what was ordered in the Judgment and, far from being a request for interpretation, amounts to an attempt to modify the substance thereof.” It further argued that “[t]he representatives’ petition would leave […] the State […] in a position in which it is forced to delay compliance with the judgment.” 25. The Commission considered it “reasonable to discuss this issue in the context of supervision in order to make the necessary adjustments.” Similarly, it indicated that in the context of implementation of the Judgment it would be appropriate to take into account the information submitted by the representatives so as to “have certain flexibility in order to take into account circumstances such as those described, which could affect the preclusive nature of the term established in the Judgment.” Considerations of the Court 26. With regard to the rehabilitation measure of medical and psychological assistance ordered in paragraphs 254 and 255 of the Judgment, the Court stated the following: strictest confidence. Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, paras. 68 and 69. 6