interpretation of the American Convention.18 Thus, in the case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, the Court considered that: Although the American Convention expressly refers to the norms of general international law for its interpretation and application,19 it is the obligations contained in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention that constitute the definitive basis for the determination of a State’s international responsibility for violations thereof. […] Consequently, the attribution of international responsibility to the State, as well as the scope and effects of the acknowledgement made in the instant case, must be made in light of the Convention itself.20 24. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court reiterates that although the American Convention has only empowered it to determine the compatibility of the States’ acts and omissions or laws with this Convention and not with the provisions of other treaties or customary norms, when making this analysis, it can, as it has in other cases (supra para. 22), interpret the obligation and the rights contained in the American Convention in light of other treaties. In this case, by using IHL as a supplementary norm of interpretation to the treaty-based provisions, the Court is not making a ranking between normative systems, because the applicability and relevance of IHL in situations of armed conflict is evident. This only means that the Court can observe the regulations of IHL, as the specific law in this area, in order to make a more specific application of the provisions of the Convention when defining the scope of the State’s obligations. 25. In the instant case, the representatives have not asked the Court to declare the State responsible for alleged violations of norms of international humanitarian law, nor did the InterAmerican Commission conclude anything similar in its report. Consequently, if necessary, the Court may refer to the provisions of the norms and principles of international humanitarian law when interpreting the obligations contained in the American Convention, with regard to the alleged violation of rights, in relation to the facts of the instant case.21 26. Consequently, the Court rejects the first preliminary objection filed by the State. B. Second preliminary objection: “Failure to exhaust domestic remedies” B.1. Arguments of the Commission and allegations of the parties 27. The State argued that the Court should not admit the case inasmuch as the requirement of previous exhaustion of the domestic jurisdiction and remedies established in Article 46(1) of the American Convention had not been complied with in the case of the presumed victims who did not have recourse to the domestic courts to obtain the declaration of the Colombian State’s responsibility and reparation for the harm it had caused as a result of the events that occurred in the village of Santo Domingo.22 The State asked the Court to reject the request for reparation of the persons who had not exhausted the domestic remedies before the Colombian contentiousadministrative jurisdiction, which is appropriate for obtaining the declaration of State responsibility 18 Cf. Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, paras. 32 to 34. See also, Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 115, and Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 209. 19 Thus, the Preamble to the American Convention refers expressly to the principles reaffirmed and refined in international instruments, with “worldwide as well as regional scope” (para. 3) and Article 29 establishes the obligation to interpret it in keeping with the American Declaration “and other international acts of the same nature.” Other articles refer to obligations imposed by international law in relation to the suspension of guarantees (Article 27), and also the “generally recognized principles of international law” in the definition of the exhaustion of domestic remedies (Article 46.1.a). 20 Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 107. 21 In this regard, the observation in the case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia is applicable that “when proceeding to determine the State’s international responsibility in the instant case, the Court cannot disregard the existence of the State’s general and special obligations to protect the civilian population derived from international humanitarian law, in particular, Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the provisions of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and relating to the protection of the victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II).” Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 114. 22 Likewise, the State requested the individualization of the presumed victims, because at the procedural moment when it was exercising its right to defense, it was still not know whether the persons who were alleging the violation of the provisions of the Convention had had recourse to local remedies to request the protection of their rights. ‐ 11 ‐