contentious-administrative jurisdiction does not, in itself, constitute a single and sufficient remedy for the integral reparation of human rights violations. Thus, they indicated that, in its answering brief, the State had alleged that there was an additional requirement for the victims to be able to file a litigation before the Court in favor of and for the protection of their right to integral reparation, suggesting that they only have one remedy in order to accede to this right and that failure to exhaust it would be sufficient reason for the Court not to have competence to make a ruling; thus, the guarantee concerning the right claimed would be denied. The fact that some of the presumed victims have not had recourse to the contentious jurisdiction is not a sufficient argument to deny them access to justice and to their right to reparation before the Court. In brief, the State is presenting this analysis, using the mechanism established in Article 42 of the Rules of Procedure, in order to exclude 18 victims who, as indicated, have been opportunely accredited by both the Commission and the representatives.23 B.2. Considerations of the Court 33. Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention establishes that, in order to determine the admissibility of a petition or communication lodged before the Inter-American Commission in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 of the Convention, the remedies under domestic law must have been pursued and exhausted, in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.24 The Court recalls that the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is conceived in the interest of the State, because it seeks to exempt the latter from responding before an international organ for acts that are attributed to it, before it has had the opportunity to remedy them by its own means.25 The foregoing signifies not only that these remedies must exist formally, but also that they must be adequate and effective, as a result of the exceptions established in Article 46(2) of the Convention.26 34. In addition, this Court has indicated consistently that an objection to the exercise of its jurisdiction based on the supposed failure to exhaust domestic remedies must be filed at the appropriate procedural moment;27 in other words, during the admissibility proceedings before the Commission.28 In this regard, when arguing the failure to exhaust domestic remedies at that time, the State must indicate the remedies that must be exhausted and their effectiveness. The Court reiterates that the interpretation that it has given to Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention for over two decades is in keeping with international law.29 35. The second preliminary objection filed by the State refers to the suitability of the Colombian contentious-administrative jurisdiction to be considered a remedy that, in the terms of Article 46 of the Convention, must be exhausted, in this case by 18 of the presumed victims who have not had 23 The representatives also argued that the presumed victims of Santo Domingo who had not used the administrative remedy suggested by the State were not exercising their right to reparation before this Court in order to enrich themselves, and especially to obtain an advantage from their condition as victims. Simply, they had resorted to the Court based on the obligations assumed by the Colombian State under the American Convention, which authorized and legitimated them to claim for the damage arising from the human rights violations committed by State agents in this case. Brief of observations on the preliminary objections of the State (merits file, tome 3, folio 876). 24 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 85, and Case of Furlan and family members v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2012 Series C No. 246, para. 23. 25 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 61, and Case of González Medina and family members v. Dominican Republic, para. 19. 26 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, para. 63, and Case of Furlan and family members v. Argentina, para. 23. 27 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary objections, para. 88, and Case of González Medina and family members v. Dominican Republic, para. 21. 28 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary objections, para. 88, and Case of Mejía Idrovo v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 5, 2011. Series C No. 228, para. 29. See also, Case of Grande v. Argentina. Preliminary objections and merits. Judgment of August 31, 2011. Series C No. 231, footnote 14. 29 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 22, and Case of Furlan and family members v. Argentina, para. 25. ‐ 13 ‐