a) The principle of distinction between civilians and combatants 212. As established in international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction refers to a customary rule for both international and non-international armed conflicts which establishes that “[t]he parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants,” that “attacks may only be directed against combatants” and that “[a]ttacks must not be directed against civilians.”307 In addition, customary international humanitarian law establishes that: “[t]he parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives,” so that “[a]ttacks may only be directed against military objectives,” while “attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.”308 Similarly, paragraph 2 of Article 13 of Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions prohibits attacks being directed against civilians or the civilian population.309 The jurisprudence of the international criminal courts has also referred to this principle.310 213. In the instant case, the Court has found proved that, in the context of confrontations with the FARC guerrilla, on December 13, 1998, the Colombian Air Force launched an AN-M1A2 cluster bomb on the village of Santo Domingo, causing the death and injury of civilians (supra para. 210). The Court takes note that the domestic judicial and administrative organs have considered that the State failed to comply with the principle of distinction when conducting the said airborne operation. b) The principle of proportionality 214. As established by international humanitarian law, the principle of proportionality refers to a customary rule for both international and non-international armed conflicts that stipulates that “[l]aunching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”311 Thus the said principle establishes a limitation to the purpose of the war, stipulating that the use of force must not be disproportionate, limiting it to what is essential to obtain the military advantage pursued.312 215. In this regard, as already indicated, although the launch of the cluster bomb directly affected the population of the village of Santo Domingo, the more general military objective of the airborne operation was the members of the guerrilla who were presumably located in a wooded area near Santo Domingo. In this hypothesis, the military advantage that the Colombian Air Force hoped to obtain was to undermine the military capability of the guerrilla located in a place where, presumably, there was no civilian population that could be incidentally affected by the cluster bomb. Consequently, the Court considers that it is not appropriate to analyze the launch of the 307 Henkaerts, Jean – Marie, Doswald – Beck Louise, Customary International humanitarian law, volume I, rules, ICRC, Cambridge 2005, Rule 1. 308 Henkaerts, Jean – Marie, Doswald – Beck Louise, Customary International humanitarian law, volume I, rules, ICRC, Cambridge, 2005, Rule 7. 309 Similarly, Rule 87 of customary international humanitarian law and Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions establish that “[c]ivilian persons and non-combatants shall be treated with humanity.” Henkaerts, Jean – Marie, Doswald – Beck Louise, Customary International humanitarian law, volume I, rules, ICRC, Cambridge 2005, Rule 87. 310 Cf. The Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter also “ICTY”), Case file: IT-96-29/1-T. “The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic.” Judgment of December 5, 2003. ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 57. See also, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, para. 29, and Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Resolution S-2/1 of the Human Rights Council, November 23, 2006, para. 25. 311 Henkaerts, Jean – Marie, Doswald – Beck Louise, Customary International humanitarian law, volume I, rules, ICRC, Cambridge, 2005, Rule 14. 312 See Inter-American Commission, Third report on the situation of human rights in Colombia. Chapter IV, “Violence and violation of international human rights law and of international humanitarian law,” doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.102. Doc. 9, rev. 1, of February 26, 1999, paras. 77 to 80. See also: Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Resolution S-2/1 of the Human Rights Council, November 23, 2006, para. 147, and Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, paras. 28, 48, 49 and 50. ‐ 64 ‐