constituted by the facts described in the Merits Report submitted to the Court’s consideration.32 Thus, it is inadmissible for the parties to allege new facts, distinct from those presented in the said report, without prejudice to describing those that may explain, clarify or reject the facts that have been mentioned in the report and submitted to the consideration of the Court.33 The exceptions to this principle are facts that are considered supervening, provided they are related to the facts of the proceedings. In addition, the presumed victims and their representatives may invoke the violation of rights other than those included in the Merits Report, provided that they relate to facts already contained in the said document, because the presumed victims are the holders of all the rights recognized in the American Convention.34 Ultimately, in each case, it is the Court that decides the admissibility of the allegations regarding the factual framework in order to ensure the procedural equality of the parties.35 48. The Court observes that the representative included numerous additional contextual facts and assertions to those described in the Commission’s Merits Report. Therefore, the Court considers it appropriate to apply the said case law, bearing in mind the arguments of Colombia about supposed new contextual references and facts included in the pleadings and arguments brief. The Court will now proceed to verify which of these facts do not merely explain or clarify the facts presented by the Inter-American Commission in the said report and which are related to the factual framework of this case. B.1) Regarding contextual references made in the pleadings and motions brief 49. In order to decide on the contextual references included in the pleadings and motions brief, the Court finds it relevant to note that the Commission’s Merits Report in this case did not include a section on the context. The Commission began the account of the facts directly by referring to “[t]he attack suffered by Mr. Vélez on August 29, 1996.” However, within the description of the events that Mr. Vélez Restrepo experienced, the Commission included some contextual references related to the protest demonstration that Mr. Vélez Restrepo was covering as a cameraman for a news program,36 and also stated that, at the time of the events, “the Colombian armed forces strongly opposed investigations against their members and, in some cases, took measures, including threats and attacks, to obstruct these procedures.”37 In its legal arguments, the Commission referred to this context as “the above-mentioned practice of the Colombian armed forces at that time of resisting and, at times, obstructing investigations against them.”38 50. For his part, when including in his chapter “Factual analysis,” numerous additional contextual facts and assertions to those in the Commission’s Merits Report, the representative explained that they provided a “conceptual framework” that would allow the 32 Cf. Case of the Five Pensioners v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 153, and Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, para. 34. 33 Cf. Case of The Five Pensioners v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 153, and Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, para. 34. 34 Case of The Five Pensioners v. Peru, Merits, reparations and costs, para. 155, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and reparations, footnote 28. 35 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 58, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and reparations, footnote 28. 36 Paragraphs 80 and 81 of Merits Report 136/10. 37 Paragraph 90 of Merits Report 136/10, and footnote 38. 38 In Paragraph 118 of Merits Report 136/10. 18