restrictions that go beyond what is allowed by law.160 The Court has held that when the public authorities establish mechanisms or tale measures to prevent the free flow of information, ideas, opinions or news, a “radical violation [occurs] of both the individual's right to express him or herself and of society’s right to be informed, so that one of the basic conditions of a democratic society is affected.”161 This scenario includes “prior censorship, the seizure or banning of publications and, in general, all those procedures that subject the expression or dissemination of information to State control.”162 140. The Inter-American Court has emphasized that “the profession of journalism […] specifically involves seeking, receiving and imparting information. Thus, the exercise of journalism requires a person to engage in activities that are defined or embraced in the freedom of expression guaranteed in the Convention.” The professional exercise of journalism “cannot be differentiated from freedom of expression, but rather, to the contrary, both are evidently interrelated, since the professional journalist is not, and cannot be, anyone other than a person who has decided to exercise freedom of expression in a continuous, regular and paid manner.”163 141. The Court has emphasized that freedom of expression, particularly in matters of public interest, “is a cornerstone in the very existence of a democratic society.” Without an effective guarantee of freedom of expression, the democratic system is weakened and pluralism and tolerance are shattered; the mechanisms of citizen control and complaint may become ineffective and, ultimately, a fertile ground is created for authoritarian systems to become entrenched.164 142. Regarding the events in this case, the Court finds it necessary to recall that Mr. Vélez Restrepo was attacked while he was performing his journalistic tasks as a cameraman for a national news program and that the attack by the soldiers was intended to harm his right to freedom of thought and expression by preventing him from continuing to record the incidents that were taking place (supra para. 78 to 81) and to disseminate the images he had recorded. The Court underscores that, although the images that Mr. Velez Restrepo was able to film were disseminated, this was due to the fact that, despite the beating he received from the soldiers, he did not relinquish the camera and, even when this was destroyed, the tape that contained the recording was not damaged and it was possible to disseminate the images he had captured when soldiers participating in the actions to control the protest demonstration attacked defenseless individuals. The Court also takes into account that, from the words that the attackers shouted while they were hitting Mr. Vélez Restrepo, it can be heard that they sought to take video “cassette” out of the camera, which they were unable to do. However, this shows that their purpose was to stop the dissemination of the images recorded by Mr. Velez Restrepo (supra para. 81). In addition, the disciplinary decision issued next day against an Army sergeant, stated that “he ordered a soldier under his command to seize the video camera of the cameraman [Luis Gonzalo 160 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, paras. 53 and 54, and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 68. 161 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, para. 54, and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 68. 162 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, para. 54, and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 68. 163 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, paras. 72 to 74, and Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 46. 164 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, para. 70, and Case of Ríos et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 105. 44