with regard to these threats and harassment, culminating in the attempted kidnapping of October 6, 1997, “the State violated Article 5(1) of the Convention to the detriment of Mr. Vélez and his family.” 153. The victims’ representative stated that he “agree[d] fully with the Inter-American Commission” regarding the alleged violations of Articles 5 and 13 of the Convention. In addition, he emphasized that the threats and harassments were reactivated based on the complaints and procedural actions that sought to obtain justice for the events of August 29, 1996. He also argued that the numerous threats caused Mr. Vélez Restrepo “profound anguish and stress that even forced him to seek psychological therapy,” and meant that the family had to move on numerous occasions. 154. The State indicated that it was not responsible for the alleged violations of the right to personal integrity and the right to freedom of thought and expression in relation to the supposed threats, harassment and attempted kidnapping that supposedly took place after the attack of August 29, 1996. Colombia disputed that these acts had occurred167 and expressed its disagreement with the Commission’s assessment of documents that form part of the disciplinary case files to conclude that they originated from State agents, as well as to affirm that there was a causal nexus between the attacks of August 29, 1996, and the alleged threats, harassment, and attempted kidnapping. Colombia underlined that “there is no evidence, either at the domestic level or within the framework of the international proceedings that can prove the State’s responsibility in relation to [those] presumed facts” and that, to the contrary, the disciplinary proceedings confirmed that State agents had not been involved in them. It affirmed that, owing to the absence of a serious investigation into the alleged threats, “the direct existence of a causal nexus between the attack suffered and the threats cannot be inferred and, in particular, the participation of State agents.” The State also argued that “neither the personal injuries sustained by Mr. Vélez Restrepo, nor the alleged threats against the victims constitute acts or conducts that the Inter-American Court or the international community as a whole have indicated to be serious human rights violations.” Considerations of the Court 155. In order to determine whether the State is responsible for the obligation to respect the right to personal integrity, the Court must determine whether the threats, harassment and attempted deprivation of liberty that occurred after August 29, 1996, could have been perpetrated by State agents, owing to a possible connection with the complaints and procedural actions filed by Mr. Vélez Restrepo for the investigation and punishment of the soldiers who attacked him on August 29, 1996. In addition, since Colombia disagreed that such events could even have occurred, the Court considers it relevant to make some additional considerations that explain the assessments made in Chapter VIII to establish as proved that, after August 29, 1996, Mr. Vélez Restrepo and his family were subjected to threats and intimidation (supra paras. 84 to 93), and that Mr. Vélez Restrepo underwent an attempted arbitrary deprivation of liberty on October 6, 1997 (supra paras. 94). 167 In its answering brief, Colombia indicated that it reiterated the position it had taken in the proceedings before the Commission. The Court observes that, before the Commission, Colombia affirmed that the probative elements “are not determinant or sufficient to prove the existence of these threats and intimidations and, in particular, to prove the alleged participation of State agents in these acts.” In addition, before the Commission, Colombia affirmed that “the mere statement of Mr. Velez Restrepo is insufficient proof to determine with certainty the existence of the alleged attempted kidnapping and that, if it did happen, the reason was the complaints filed by Mr. Velez or the fact that he was a journalist.“ However, in this answering brief, Colombia also affirmed before the Court that it “is aware that the absence of a serious investigation into the alleged threats does not permit the State to affirm with certainty that these threats did not exist.” 47