176. Article 5(1) of the Convention recognizes the right to personal, physical, mental and moral integrity. The Court has established that “[t]he violation of the right to physical and mental integrity of the individual is a type of violation that has different levels that range from torture to other types of abuse or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the physical and psychological effects off which vary in intensity according to endogenous and exogenous factors that must be proved in each specific situation.” 181 In other words, the personal characteristics of a presumed victim of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment must be taken into account when determining whether personal integrity was violated and, consequently, whether the degree of suffering and feeling of humiliation was increased, when they were subjected to certain treatments. 182 In addition, the Court has held that the mere threat that a conduct prohibited by Article 5 of the Convention may occur, when this is sufficiently real and imminent, may in itself be in conflict with the right to personal integrity. In that regard, creating a threatening situation or threatening an individual with taking his or her life may, at least in some circumstances, be considered inhuman treatment.183 The Court has also referred to the elements that must be present to consider that an act is torture.184 177. The Court considers that the new facts introduced by the representative in his observations on the acknowledgment of responsibility and in his final arguments, to the effect that the said acts of threat and intimidation should be characterized as torture, are not admissible as they are time-barred.185 178. According to the testimony of Mr. Vélez Restrepo and Mrs. Román Amariles, and the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Kessler given before this Court, it has been proved that the said threats and harassment that occurred between September 1996 and February 1997 and that were repeated in September and early October 1997, as well as the attempted deprivation of liberty on October 6, 1997, caused the members of the Vélez Román family constant fear and tension and “overwhelming anxiety” that was detrimental to their mental integrity. It should be emphasized that, although most of the threats were directed at Mr. Vélez Restrepo, it was Mrs. Roman Amariles who had to face the difficult situation of dealing with numerous threatening telephone calls to her husband, some of which also mentioned 181 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits, para. 57, and Case of the Barrios Family v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 52. 182 Cf. Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 4, 2006. Series C No. 149, para. 127, and Case of the Barrios Family v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 52. 183 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 165, and Case of the Barrios Family v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 82. 184 The Court understands that the elements that constitute torture are as follows: (a) an intentional act; (b) that causes severe physical or mental suffering, and (c) that is committed with a specific objective or purpose. Furthermore, it has indicated that “when assessing the severity of the suffering experienced, the Court must take into account the specific circumstances of each case, bearing in mind endogenous and exogenous factors. The former refer to the characteristics of the treatment, such as the duration, the method used, or the way in which the suffering was inflicted, as well as the physical and mental effects that it tends to cause. The latter refers to the conditions of the person who undergoes the said ordeal, such as age, sex, health, and any other personal circumstance.” Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 74; Case of Bueno Alves v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 164, paras. 79 and 83, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2010. Series C No. 216, para. 110. 185 The representative indicated that the events that took place in Caquetá on August 29, 1996, and “the subsequent campaign of threats and harassment against Richard Vélez and his family, [should be] seen as a plan made with a single objective, [and] constitute a very clear case of torture.” According to the representative, in view of the purpose of the threats and harassment and the “severe psychological harm“ that they produced, “the said acts of violence should be assessed as part of a single sequence that cannot be separated or disassociated from the initial torture against Richard in Caquetá.” 54