249. Moreover, the Court must call attention to the fact that no one was punished for having beaten Mr. Vélez Restrepo on August 29, 1996, in either the criminal or the disciplinary investigations. The Court notes that one of the disciplinary decisions established that one of the soldiers was sanctioned for having given the order that Mr. Vélez Restrepo’s “video camera be seized,” and that “in compliance with that order, it appears that abuses were committed against Mr. […] Vélez.” The Court recalls that the attack on Mr. Vélez Restrepo was even recorded in images and sound. Even though the faces of the soldiers who hit him were not revealed, it is reasonable to state that, in a case that was not very complicated to investigate, many other elements existed that would have permitted the identification of the soldiers responsible for hitting him. The Court stresses that the lack of diligence in the investigation also includes these aspects. 250. The Court also finds it relevant to refer to the terms in which the State made its partial acknowledgement of responsibility concerning the absence of a serious criminal investigation of the attack on Mr. Vélez Restrepo of August 29, 1996. Colombia acknowledged its responsibility only because it had been unable to prove its diligence in the said investigation as a result of the loss of the criminal case file (supra para. 14). In this regard, the Court has already established that the said criminal investigation did not respect the guarantee of due process of the principle of the natural judge (supra para. 245). In addition, the Court notes that, the considering paragraphs of the final decision of the military criminal investigation, a document that was provided to these proceedings, do not even mentioned the specific attack suffered by the journalist Vélez Restrepo and decided that “it [was] not possible to open criminal proceedings and direct the investigation towards any specific soldier on active duty.”240 This Court finds that this reveals a lack of due diligence in the investigation. 251. Finally, regarding the investigation of the attempted deprivation of liberty of Mr. Vélez Restrepo, the State acknowledged that, in the investigation into the crime of attempted kidnapping “the reasonable time” was violated (supra para. 14). The Court has noted that, in the Merits Report, the Commission argued that the investigation into the attempted kidnapping “has not been carried out diligently and within a reasonable time.” Since the State did not expressly accept the alleged lack of diligence in the investigation, the Court must recall that the conduct of the judicial authorities constitutes one of the elements that form part of the analysis to determine a violation of reasonable time.241 Therefore, the Court understands that, implicitly, the State acknowledged that it had not complied with this standard of due diligence. 252. Based on the above considerations and on the State’s partial acknowledgment of responsibility, the Court concludes that the domestic investigations did not constitute effective remedies to guarantee access to justice and the determination of the truth, the investigation and punishment of those responsible, and the integral reparation of the consequences of the violations. None of the human rights violations declared in this Judgment was investigated seriously and diligently by the State authorities. Consequently, the State is responsible for the violation of Articles 8(1) and 25 of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Luis Gonzalo Vélez Restrepo, Aracelly Román Amariles, and their children Mateo and Juliana Vélez Román. 240 The first part of the decision mentions Mr. Vélez Restrepo merely to indicate that he was one of the injured attended at the María Auxiliadora Hospital in Florencia and that he was the only one of the injured who went to the Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences for an evaluation. 241 Cf. Case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 77, and Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, para. 49. 73