recommendation be suspended until the [representative] states his opinion in this regard.” Consequently, it asked the Court to reject this measure of reparation. 262. The representative did not refer to this measure of reparation. 263. The Court finds it relevant to recall that the State has the obligation to guarantee the freedom of movement and residence of Mr. Vélez Restrepo and the members of the Vélez Román family, which includes the obligation to establish the conditions and means that permit them to return safely and with dignity.251 This, in turn, constitutes a restitution of the right violated. 264. In this regard, the Court appreciates the State’s intention to provide the necessary safety measures for Mr. Vélez and family to return to live in Colombia when they so decide. However, the Court observes that the representative did not refer to this measure, and that, when testifying at the public hearing, Mr. Vélez Restrepo and Mrs. Román Amariles expressed their desire to return to Colombia, but at the same time consider that certain circumstances make it difficult for them to take that decision, such as fear because of the country’s security situation, their situation of financial instability owing to the fact that Mr. Vélez Restrepo lost his job in Colombia and has not contributed to social security, and the family’s situation because their children are studying in the United States of America. The Court underscores that the two latter reasons result from the forced exile. 265. The Court considers that an appropriate measure to repair the consequences of the violations that have been declared is to order the State to guarantee the conditions for the Vélez Román family to return to live in Colombia if they so decide.252 Since the Vélez Román family’s intention to return to Colombia is unclear, the State’s compliance with this measure requires the victims’ prior expression of their real and true intention to return to Colombia, and they are granted one year for this. If, within the said time frame, the victims express their intention of returning to Colombia, a period of two years will then begin to be calculated for the State and the victims to reach the relevant agreement for the State to guarantee them the said conditions for their return to Colombia. The State must pay the expenses of the return of the members of the family and their belongings. 266. If, within the said one-year period, the members of the Vélez Román family state that they do not wish to live in Colombia, the State will not have a measure of reparation to fulfill in relation to this Judgment. However, if, in the future, Mr. Vélez Restrepo and the members of his family return to Colombia, the State must comply with its general obligation to guarantee them the rights to life and personal integrity, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 5 and 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights in relation to Article 1(1) thereof.. B.2) Rehabilitation: health care for the victims 267. The representative stated that he “considers […] essential” the need to “determine measures of reparation that provide adequate attention to the victims’ psychological and physical problems,” and therefore asked the Court to order the State to cover “the cost for the Vélez Román family of all the psycho-social and medical assistance required to alleviate 251 Cf. Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 120, and Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010. Series C No. 212, para. 150. 252 Cf. Case of Contreras et al. v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 197. 76